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**Proliferation
Issues**

Proliferation Issues

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ROK Minister Says DPRK Nuclear Issue Must Be Solved First

SK0311081493 Seoul YONHAP in English 0802 GMT
3 Nov 93

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 3 (YONHAP)—Deputy Prime Minister Han Wan-sang told a seminar on unification Wednesday that the North Korean nuclear problem should be settled before "all other matters in inter-Korean relations."

"North Korea's nuclear problem should be resolved in a way not to increase tension on the Korean peninsula," he added, hinting that Seoul will seek a solution to the problem by negotiation with Pyongyang despite the passage of a United Nations resolution on the issue.

Cooperation among concerned nations is absolutely necessary because of the international nature of the nuclear problem, Han, who is also national unification minister, said in his keynote speech. The seminar at the Korea Press Center was organized by the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club.

"When the North Korean nuclear problem is settled, Seoul will pursue a policy to embrace North Korea," he said.

ROK Ministers' Remarks on North's Nuclear Issue

SK2910112093 Seoul YONHAP in English 1103 GMT
29 Oct 93

[Text] Seoul, Oct. 29 (YONHAP)—Prime Minister Hwang In-song on Friday ruled out the possibility of South Korea possessing nuclear enrichment reprocessing facilities under the present circumstances.

"To possess such facilities now may serve to justify North Korea's nuclear development and is prone to harm our international credibility in terms of the peaceful use of atomic energy," Hwang said.

While testifying at a National Assembly interpellation session, the premier said it is true that the inter-Korean denuclearization declaration prohibits the possession of enrichment reprocessing facilities by both parties.

But, he said, this does not mean the South has given up nuclear-related technology development or the use of nuclear fuel.

"When nuclear proliferation is successfully contained and conditions are fully fostered for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the issue of nuclear enrichment reprocessing facilities would be resolved as a matter of course," Hwang said.

Also testifying at the assembly session, Deputy Prime Minister Han Wan-sang said, "North Korea is believed to possess a specific amount of nuclear material necessary for the development nuclear weapons."

In the wake of their withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Han said, North Korea has been concentrating on improving relations with the United States, using the nuclear question as a negotiation card.

Han, who is also the National Unification minister, said that even if inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were

realized, the North Korean nuclear issues cannot be resolved without mutual nuclear inspections between the two Koreas.

He said that the Seoul government has no intent of absorbing North Korea to accomplish national unification.

"But we are prepared for all eventualities including the possible rapid collapse of the North Korean system due to its internal problems," Han said.

Defense Minister Kwon Yong-hae, in his testimony, said there are no underground military airstrips in North Korea. "But, they do have underground aircraft hangars at about 20 military airfields," Kwon said.

He said emergency airstrips have been built at several places in the North, which he said enables war planes to be armed and otherwise prepared for take-off in underground hangars and directly take off once out of hangars.

Kwon also said that 60 percent of the North Korean ground forces and 65 percent of all naval vessels are deployed in areas South of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.

Vice Foreign Minister Hong Sun-yong, also at the assembly session, said North Korea has raised no demand formally or informally for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces in South Korea.

"At any rate, the presence of the U.S. Forces in Korea has nothing to do with the nuclear question," Hong said.

"It is just unthinkable that we study possible U.S. military withdrawal in return for the resolution of the nuclear question."

DPRK Radio Warns ROK Against Taking 'Military Countermeasures'

SK0511015593 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1300 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Seoul Radio-1 reported that on 3 November, South Korean Defense Minister Kwon Yong-hae met with U.S. Defense Secretary Aspin who flew into Seoul. It further said Minister Kwon babbled that the North's nuclear development constitutes a serious challenge to the entire world's efforts to maintain peace as well as to the Korean peninsula.

In a special news conference with broadcast reporters held on 2 November, Kwon Yong-hae found fault with our nonexistent nuclear development and professed that South Korea will not hesitate to resort to so-called military countermeasures.

Such reckless, provocative, and outrageous remarks made by Kwon Yong-hae are dangerous, militant, and awkward statements aimed at putting the brakes on the exchange of North-South special envoys and DPRK-U.S. talks and at leading the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war. The statements hide the insidious efforts of the South Korean authorities to forcefully strangle [apsal] the popular masses-centered socialism of our style with outside forces.

We neither intend, nor are capable of developing nuclear weapons. As the world is aware, we are using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and we are consistently

making efforts for peace and security not only on the Korean peninsula but also in the world.

The innocence and transparency of our nuclear policy have already been clearly proven in the two rounds of DPRK-U.S. talks. We have shown deeper interest than anyone else in resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. We have made efforts to fairly resolve it through dialogue.

Nevertheless, the boss of the South Korean military establishment which claims to be an agency of civilian-led government, raved about military countermeasures. This amounts to a denial of their current regime as a civilian-led government, totally rejecting the solution of the nuclear question through dialogue, and virtually declaring North-South military confrontation.

Now that the South Korean military authorities have openly declared that they plan to counter us with force of arms, it is inevitable for us to reciprocate the provokers' declaration with force of arms. It is our position to respond to dialogue with dialogue and to war with war.

Military countermeasures are tantamount to war [kun-sajok taeungun kot chonjaengul uimihanda]. If South Korean puppets dare to ignite war against us, we will resolutely counter fire with fire and inflict over a thousand-fold of punishment on provokers.

The South Korean authorities should clearly realize that military countermeasures will only result in their destruction, and therefore they should not run amok.

DPRK Daily Says ROK Pursuing Nuclear, Chemical Warfare

SK0211051793 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0437 GMT 2 Nov 93

[“NODONG SINMUN Accuses S. Korean Rulers of Scheming To Inflict Nuclear and Chemical Warfare Scourge on Nation”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, November 2 (KCNA)—The South Korean authorities at a recent “meeting of departments concerned” decided to possess chemical weapons and seek “parliamentary ratification” in 1994. This shows they are pursuing not only a nuclear but a chemical warfare against fellow countrymen, declares NODONG SINMUN today.

The news analyst says:

It is not fortuitous that on the threshold of their decision to possess chemical weapons, the South Korean authorities made much ado about the fictitious “chemical weapons development” of the North. This reveals their ulterior intention to possess chemical weapons legitimately, not in camera while abusing the North.

The South Korean rulers, who scheme to inflict the scourge of nuclear and chemical warfare on fellow countrymen, acting a shock force of foreign aggressors, are a group of warmaniacs and traitors without precedent in the world. Never to be condoned is the criminal scheme of the “civilian”-veiled warmaniacs to promote the production of chemical weapons, worldwide-banned weapons of mass destruction, going against the trend of the times toward disarmament and detente and inflict the scourge of chemical warfare on fellow countrymen.

They had better give up the criminal preparations for nuclear and chemical warfare and act with discretion.

If they continue to do anti-national acts of bringing nuclear and chemical clouds to the Korean peninsula in collusion with outside forces despite our warnings, they will be held responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom and face a stern judgement by history.

ROK President Favors Deadline To Resolve DPRK Issue

SK0611003793 Seoul YONHAP in English 0018 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Text] Washington, Nov. 5 (YONHAP)—President Kim Yong-sam, declaring that it is essential to send “a clear message” to Pyongyang, says it is about time South Korea and the United States considered the possibility of setting a deadline to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

“The best thing is to solve this (nuclear) problem through dialogue,” the president says in an interview with the Washington Post.

Kim was interviewed in Seoul on Thursday after South Korea and the United States held a two-day South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SMC) attended by Korean Defense Minister Kwon Yong-hae and his U.S. counterpart, Les Aspin, who had also conferred with President Kim.

The newspaper said, however, that President Kim also indicated that his patience with North Korea might be running low.

“North Korea has a habit of demanding more and more, and if you make one concession, they demand another,” Kim told the interviewer. “I think perhaps it is about time that we should consider the possibility of setting a deadline.”

There have been fears that economic sanctions might drive the North Koreans to military retaliation, the Post said.

But Kim said he was not seriously concerned about the possibility.

“Imposing economic sanctions on North Korea does not directly translate into military action by North Korea, because the United States and Korea are maintaining a strong defense posture...to deter and repel any attack to be made by North Korea,” Kim said.

ROK Papers on DPRK's Suspension of Envoy Contact

SK0611095893

[Editorial Report] The following summarizes reports carried by ROK vernacular newspapers after North Korea canceled the working-level contact for the South-North special envoy exchange scheduled for 4 November, 1993.

The moderate CHOSON ILBO in Korean on 4 November carries a 600-word article on page 4 by reporter An Hui-chang titled “Resolution Shock, North Readjusts Strategy.”

The article reports that “the majority of ROK Government officials analyze North Korea’s response to the UN

resolution as a desperate measure to gain some time to readjust its foreign relations strategy," rather than a measure to secure a better position in the behind-the-scene negotiations with the United States.

The article says that the fact that not a single country supported it in the vote on the UN resolution has considerably shocked North Korea, however, it will be difficult for North Korea to accept the inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, which North Korea has said it has been partial.

The article deems that "North Korea thought there was little chance that our side would agree to the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise in the fourth contact for the special envoy exchange and, therefore, it postponed the contact in which it has nothing to gain by facing the South side's various demands, including the IAEA inspection."

The moderate TONG-A ILBO in Korean on 4 November carries a 600-word article on page 4 by reporter Pak Che-kyun titled "Time-earning Strategy To Counter UN Resolution."

The article says there was concern that North Korea would withdraw from the United Nations as a result of the UN resolution, but North Korea chose a comparatively moderate response by rejecting the working-level contact for the special envoy exchange. The article quotes a government official concerned saying: The response is a result of not being able to find an appropriate countermeasure in time.

The article analyzes that North Korea left some room for compromise in the 3 November telephone message by stating in the last part of the message "we will wait and see your side's attitude for the time being." The article notes that if North Korea meant to reject South-North dialogue, it would not have left such room.

The article continued that North Korea's pretext for rejecting the contact was the ROK defense minister's remarks, which it changed from "we intend to discuss the countermeasures on the possible military aggression by North Korea," to "we will not hesitate to take military countermeasures." The article interprets that such exaggeration means North Korea had a difficult time finding a proper pretext.

The moderate HANGUK ILBO in Korean on 4 November carries an 800-word article on page 4 by reporter Yu Sung-u titled "Delay Strategy of Special Envoy Exchange and Nuclear Discussion."

The article analyzes that North Korea did not want any development in South-North dialogue when other negotiations, including the contacts with the United States and the inspection negotiation with the IAEA, are at a standstill.

The article also reports that the opinion of the Ministry of National Unification Board, NUB, is that "North Korea postponed the working-level contact to seek a new nuclear strategy and to adjust internal opinions because the hard-liners and moderates have not come to an agreement on the UN resolution situation, which was not in North Korea's nuclear game timetable."

The article speculates that the hard-liners are opposing the exchange of special envoys because North Korea had expected that before such exchange, our side would have confirmed the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise at the Security Consultative Meeting, SCM.

The moderate CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean on 4 November carries a 600-word article on page 4 by reporter O Yong-hwan titled "Defense Strategy Using Defense Minister Kwon's Remarks."

Commenting on North Korea's distortion of Defense Minister Kwon's remarks, the article views that the reasons for rejecting the Panmunjom contact are "its intention to wait and see the result of the annual ROK-U.S. SCM regarding the Team Spirit exercise; the date for the third round of North Korea-U.S. talks not being fixed after four behind-the-scene contacts in New York; and the UN General Assembly's adoption of a resolution against North Korea."

The article also speculates that the North Korean military hard-liners may have influenced the suspension of the contact.

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN in Korean on 4 November carries a 700-word article on page 4 by reporter Yang Sung-hyon titled "Time-winning Strategy, Not a Flat Refusal."

The article reports that the government is quite perplexed by North Korea's cancellation of the contact, and describes the North's reaction "seemingly hard-line."

The article also reports that upon receiving the news during their meeting, ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hubbard analyzed that North Korea canceled the contact because it needed some time to adjust internal opinions.

The article says the fact that during the third contact the North side wanted to schedule the fourth contact after 5 November, when the SCM is over, supports the analysis.

The article further analyzes that "the North's reaction is in line with its own timetable" and that "its real intention will become clearer after the outcome of the U.S.-North Korea contact, which is expected to be resumed sooner or later in New York upon the request of the North side."

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean on 4 November carries a 600-word article on page 4 by reporter Song Yong-sung titled "Not Refusal But Postponement, To Earn Time in Making Nuclear Decision."

The article reports ROK Government officials estimate that North Korea is not taking Defense Minister Kwon's remarks seriously but using it as pretext for refusing the contact, and quotes an NUB official's interpretation: We have to take note of the clause "it is difficult to hold the fourth working-level contact as scheduled" from North Korea's telephone message.

The article observes that "the recent development of the situation has made North Korea adhere more to its policy to resolve all problems through negotiations with the United States, and to this end, North Korea will come back to the South North contact at a proper time because it has to maintain a certain level of dialogue."

The article reports that North Korea-U.S. contacts up to this point have narrowed the negotiation to an agreement on routine inspections, and the question of whether to accept inspections on four nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, as requested by the United States, or two, as insisted by the North side.

The article concludes that the resumption of the special envoy contact depends on the results of North Korea-U.S. contact to be held around the end of this week in New York.

Kim, Hosokawa Hold Joint News Conference

*SK0711021593 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network in Korean
2331 GMT 6 Nov 93*

[News conference by ROK President Kim Yong-sam and Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa by foreign and domestic correspondents in Kyongju, South Korea—live; Prime Minister Hosokawa speaks in Japanese with phrase-by-phrase translation into Korean]

[Text] [Kim Yong-sam] We will now begin the news conference. How are you, domestic and foreign reporters? I am glad to meet you here in Kyongju, where the 1,000-year-old culture of Silla is still pulsating.

First, I think Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa's visit to our country is very significant as it is the first occasion he has had to visit a nation in Asia. I wish to welcome him once again.

Yesterday and today, Prime Minister Hosokawa and myself frankly and open-mindedly exchanged views on the recent international situation and on means to promote relations between the ROK and Japan in a very amicable atmosphere.

We shared the view that when greeting the Asian-Pacific era, which is now a reality, it is now more urgent than ever before that our two countries build a new type of friendly and cooperative relation based on the common ideal of free democracy and market economy.

The prime minister and I have shared the view that although the cold-war system has ended worldwide, the remains of the cold-war and the factors of instability still exist on the Korean peninsula, and have agreed that the two countries will closely cooperate for the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue and for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

[Kim Yong-sam continues] We have agreed that our two countries will join efforts to develop their increasingly interdependent economic relations in a more balanced manner.

For the bright future of ROK-Japanese relations, it is necessary for the peoples of the two countries to be willing to become good-neighborly partners who understand and trust each other.

Prime Minister Hosokawa and I have agreed that our two countries will make joint efforts to become genuinely close neighbors by overcoming past problems through the establishment of a correct awareness of history in a rational position.

In this connection, the two countries have agreed to promote the exchange between the peoples of the two countries more actively from now on.

I was deeply impressed and moved by Prime Minister Hosokawa's insight into and firm faith in the future.

With success in the reform policy implemented in both the ROK and Japan, I wish to cooperate closely with Prime Minister Hosokawa to establish new ROK-Japanese relations, our two countries—the new ROK and the new Japan—hand in hand.

Although it was a brief period of one night and two days, I believe these talks will prove to be a new turning point for the development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the ROK and Japan. Thank you.

[Morihiro Hosokawa] I am very glad that I have met President Kim Yong-sam in Kyongju and held candid talks in a free atmosphere. I express my wholehearted gratitude to His Excellency President and other personages concerned for their warm welcome toward us.

Both President Kim and I are committed to the historic reform in response to the demand of the times. I feel strong sympathy with the reform President Kim is pushing forward, and express strong and deep respect for President Kim's courage and his leadership.

Today it is the historical task of the international community to build a new peace order after the cold-war. During these talks, we have reconfirmed the common awareness of the North Korean nuclear weapons development issue. I think we should build firm Japanese-ROK relations in the international community by further promoting cooperative relations in the international community, particularly the Asian-Pacific region.

[Morihiro Hosokawa continues] The two countries of Japan and the ROK are neighboring countries that share the basic values of freedom, democracy, and a market economy. For the two countries, the development of their relations is a task of high priority. I deeply repent [pan-song] and express a wholehearted apology [chinsa] for the unbearable sadness and pain of various forms the people on the Korean peninsula suffered from the colonial rule of our country in the past—deprived of their opportunity for the education of their mother tongue and forced to change their names into a Japanese style.

Frankly facing up to the past and always learning a lesson from history, I wish to make renewed and continuous efforts in cooperation with President Kim to lay a firm foundation for the future partnership relations between Japan and the ROK.

Needless to say, it is important for Japan and the ROK to push ahead with extensive cooperation. We highly appraised that Japanese and ROK businessmen are making efforts to build new economic relations. The governments of the two countries have confirmed their position that they will also carry on possible cooperation on their part as well. Above all, it is important to promote the human and cultural exchange to deepen the mutual understanding of the peoples of the two countries. In particular, we have promised to make active efforts to

promote the expanded exchange of youth and juveniles, including the admission of ROK students into Japanese educational institutions.

It is important to promote, henceforth, an atmosphere in which the peoples of the two countries can have candid discussions on the desirable form of Japanese-ROK cooperation. I am convinced these talks marked an important step toward to this end. Thank you.

[Kim Yong-sam] Now we will receive questions from reporters.

[Kang Chol-ung of HANGYORE SINMUN] I welcome Prime Minister Hosokawa's visit to the ROK.

I would like to ask the prime minister a question. I understand that during summit talks he'd on 6 November, you discussed many ways to develop the relations between the two countries into a future-oriented relationship.

There are pending economic issues between the ROK and Japan, including the issue of correcting the trade unbalance and the issue of technology transfer.

You, the prime minister, please tell us if you have concrete steps for solution of these issues?

[Morihiko Hosokawa] The relations among the three nations of Japan, the United States, and the ROK are regarded as very important in the world.

In particular, for our country, the promotion of relations with the ROK, our neighbor, is important not only to the relations between our two countries, but also to that of Asia and Pacific, as well as to international community.

Based on this, I talked on this issue with His Excellency President on 6 November. We confirmed that we will maintain close liaison in the future by making phone calls to each other at any time through a hot line.

I think exchanges at all levels, including economic and manpower, between the two countries are important. In particular, I think your question is focused on economic issues. The issue of a trade unbalance between Japan and the ROK does exist.

Action programs were adopted in July of last year. These programs showed the direction of investments and technology transfer.

As for us, we will make all possible efforts to implement these programs. In addition, proposals were presented during a Japanese-ROK forum held on 11 November. To implement these proposals, we should cooperate with each other in a satisfactory manner.

[Mr. Terasaki from NHK] I would like to ask President Kim a question.

Concerning the issue on past history, Prime Minister Hosokawa made candid remarks on self-examination and apologized during the 6 November summit talks and even at this news conference. How do you, Mr. President, accept this? Do you think a certain settlement will be made on this issue?

What kind of concrete ideas do you, Mr. President, have on new Japanese-ROK relations?

[Kim Yong-sam] Prime Minister Hosokawa and I talked about this for a long time. He mentioned this even at this news conference this morning.

Indeed, I was deeply impressed by the candid attitude of Prime Minister Hosokawa. Many successive prime ministers of the government of the Liberal Democratic Party have been involved in this issue, but they failed to show such an attitude.

We think we should now open the 21st Century—the new era—by advancing toward a bright future. To do this, I think it is very important that we build mature, good-neighborly relations by promoting mutual trust and understanding.

In particular, concerning our cooperation, we shared the view that maintaining economic cooperation based on mutual benefit and balance is important.

[Mr. Mizuno from YOMIURI SHIMBUN] I heard that during the talks on 6 November, Japan and the ROK agreed to cooperate with each other to cope with the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons development. How will Japan and the ROK deal with this?

People, including people from the United States, talk about sanctions in the event North Korea does not change its attitude. Do you think there is a possibility of sanctions?

Concerning North Korea's missile development issue, an idea on Theater Missile Defense [TMD] has been presented by the United States and other countries. How will Japan cope with this situation?

[Morihiko Hosokawa] The issue of North Korea's nuclear development and missile development is causing serious worry, not only to Japan and the ROK, but also to the international community.

We shared the view that we have no other choice, but to pay deep attention to this issue. I think Japan, the ROK, and the United States should cope with this issue by maintaining close liaison in order to make North Korea remain in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and implement the North-South joint declaration on denuclearization.

As for the issue of sanctions, we cannot foresee how this issue will develop in the future. At the 6 November talks we agreed that it is important to make patient efforts to solve the problem through dialogue to every possible extent.

As for the idea on the TMD, working-level officials from Japan and the United States will discuss it in mid-November. During the talks, Japan will carefully listen to any idea by the United States and will review how we should deal with this by considering the relationship between our country's defense plan and this idea.

[Yun Chang-chun from SEGYE ILBO] I would like to ask President Kim Yong-sam a question.

You, the two top leaders, agreed to make the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] the most important central organization in the Asian-Pacific region. What do you mean by central organization? Will you explain in detail

how the ROK and Japan will cooperate with each other in this organization in the future?

[Kim Yong-sam] I always considered the Asian-Pacific region the center of the world in terms of economics. As you know very well, this region shares 55 percent of the gross national product of the whole world.

As you pointed out, we wish to further expand trade and investment within the region through APEC. Moreover, the APEC is an organization pursuing opening. Therefore, I think that doing everything in an open manner, instead of adhering to regionalism, is desirable. In particular, neither the ROK nor Japan belong to a certain group. Therefore, we are in a good position to carry out freely activities within the region.

We agreed the two countries will continue discussions and consultations regarding how we will operate in the APEC in close cooperation with each other.

Since it is cold, now I would like to conclude this news conference. Thank you all.

Analysis Sees Summit Positive for Future ROK-Japanese Ties

SK0711034093 Seoul YONHAP in English 0304 GMT 7 Nov 93

[‘News Analysis’ by Yi Dong-min: “Korea-Japan Summit Help Close Book on Unhappy Past”]

[Text] Kyongju, South Korea, Nov. 7 (YONHAP)—The South Korea-Japan summit this weekend may well go down in history as the meeting that helped the two countries close the book on the dark past and turn their eyes to the future.

The summit had no pressing issues to cover. President Kim Yong-sam and Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa meant to touch base on matters of common interest, and this was exactly what they did.

They talked about the need for continued dialogue with North Korea on solving the nuclear problem, about their interests in developing the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), about shared concerns over Russia’s nuclear dumping in the East Sea and a host of other bilateral and regional issues.

But the image and the atmosphere were different, due much to Hosokawa’s explicit apology for the past and Kim’s clear expression of appreciation for the apology.

Hosokawa named Japan as the culprit of the “unbearable pains” caused on the Korean people during the colonial years and said he repents and apologizes for the past. He did not hesitate to name the crimes, describing how Koreans were barred from using their own language, were forced to change names into Japanese, how Korean women were mobilized as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers while young men were forced into labor camps.

He repeated the apologetic words at a press conference Sunday, and President Kim gave unexpectedly high praises to Hosokawa’s actions.

“I was greatly impressed by his honest attitude,” Kim told the press conference. He went as far as comparing him to

other prime ministers, saying Hosokawa’s words were impressive because other prime ministers who came and went “weren’t like him.”

It’s true that both Seoul and Tokyo were eager to shed the burden of the unhappy past but couldn’t because of still resentful public sentiments. By going through the process of apologizing and accepting the apology, the two leaders did their parts in calming these sentiments.

The agreements on opening a hot line between their offices and on establishing a “new initiative for economic partnership” are outward gestures to show that the past is sealed and the eyes are now on the future.

But closing the past really means more responsibility on South Korea, officials say. “Once we free Japan from its shackles from the past, it will run, and very fast,” one Foreign Ministry official said on how he sees future Seoul-Tokyo relations.

“It means Japan has no more owed moral obligations toward Korea and will treat it as any other member of the international community,” he said.

This attitude will apparently affect bilateral trade relations. President Kim already declared he wants to leave the problem of trade imbalance to the workings of economic principles instead of seeking a political solution.

Although Hosokawa personally promised his efforts to increase Japanese investment and technology transfer to South Korea, doubts remain whether the private business sector will follow his expectations.

South Korea and Japan are starting from scratch to define a new relationship. How the relationship takes form will depend on how determined people are to fulfill what their leaders agreed on this weekend.

DPRK Cancels Meeting With ROK on Exchanging Envoys

Cancellation Due to Ministers’ ‘Dangerous Remarks’
SK0311092393 Seoul YONHAP in English 0903 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 3 (YONHAP)—North Korea informed the South on Wednesday [3 November] they would not attend the fourth working-level contact set to take place on Thursday [4 November] at Panmunjom to discuss the proposed exchange of special envoys between the two Koreas.

In a telephone message to the South, Pak Yong-su, North Korea’s chief delegate to the working-level contact, charged, “your side’s defense minister made dangerous remarks in a special press conference on Tuesday, in which he said even military action would not be ruled out ‘with regard to our nuclear development’ that does not exist.”

Pak went on to say in the message, “these intemperate remarks by your side’s military authorities amount to denying the on-going Panmunjom working-level contact itself and to declaring a military confrontation between the South and the North.”

Under the circumstances, he said, it has become difficult to hold the fourth working-level contact as planned. "making it impossible for our delegation to go to Panmunjom."

Recalling that a former South Korean Defense Minister openly spoke of a military strike against "our Yongbyon area" once in the past to bring about an irrevocable grave consequence, the North Korean official asserted that "the exactly same thing was repeated by your side's military authorities, putting our working-level contact itself to the danger of its becoming meaningless."

Pak said the North believes that responsibility for the development lies entirely in the South, adding that "we will watch your side's attitude over a time."

An observer here said North Korea is boycotting Thursday's contact obviously because they are in an unfavorable position due to the recent adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of a resolution against them over the nuclear issue.

ROK Government Deplores Cancellation

SK0411033993 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0305 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] This morning the government sent a telephone message to North Korea in the name of Song Yong-tae, vice minister of the National Unification Board [NUB] and our side's senior delegate to the North-South working-level contact. The message said our government strongly urges the North to respond to the working-level contact in order to realize the exchange of special envoys.

In the message, the government said it is deplorable that North Korea postponed the talks by intentionally distorting true intentions contained in the remarks of our side's defense minister in the wake of final negotiations on the draft agreement on the procedure for exchanging special envoys.

In particular, North Korea unilaterally nullified even the date of talks agreed to by the two sides. This causes suspicion over the will for realization of the exchange of special envoys.

Meanwhile, in a news conference, Song Yong-tae, vice minister of the NUB, said the government understands that North Korea has temporarily suspended dialogue in order to readjust its opinions in the wake of pressure of international sanctions, rather than the refusal of overall dialogue. He added that the government will work out countermeasures after watching the North side's attitude for the time being.

ROK Government Urges North To Reschedule

SK0411062793 Seoul YONHAP in English 0610 GMT
4 Nov 93

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 4 (YONHAP)—South Korea has expressed regret to North Korea for refusing to attend Thursday's scheduled fourth round of inter-Korean working-level talks on an exchange of special envoys, and urged it reschedule the meeting as soon as possible.

"It is regrettable that your side suspended the inter-Korean working-level contact on the pretext of improper reasons at

this juncture when both sides are about to hold final negotiations on procedural matters related to an exchange of special envoys," South Korean Chief Delegate Song Yong-tae said in a telephone message Thursday to his North Korean counterpart.

"It is a thousand pities that your side has put off the meeting by intentionally distorting the true meaning of our defense minister's remarks. I strongly urge that your side, rightly aware of the grave situation caused by your action, should come again to the working-level contact as soon as possible.

"The international community recently expressed its grave concern that your side has failed to discharge its nuclear safeguards obligations and has widened the area of non-compliance. It is hoped that your side will avoid international sanctions by not dragging out the solution of your nuclear issue.

"As our side has maintained a position of solving the nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue, your side should make a sincere approach to solution of the issue with renewed recognition of the issue and renewed determination to solve it."

Aspin Links Recognition of DPRK to Nuclear Program

OW3010021093 Tokyo KYODO in English 0157 GMT
30 Oct 93

[Text] Washington, Oct. 29 KYODO—Defense Secretary Les Aspin on Friday [29 October] tied the possibility of U.S. recognition of North Korea to Pyongyang addressing international concern about its suspected nuclear weapons program.

"Progress on items of interest of North Korea rests on the North's willingness to forthrightly address international concern about its nuclear program," Aspin said in a written interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

Aspin, who is leaving next week for a trip to Japan and South Korea, did not directly address the possibility that the U.S. may extend official recognition to North Korea.

In reply to a question about future possibility for the U.S. to recognize North Korea and conditions for recognition, Aspin tied the answer to another question on U.S. preconditions for canceling the joint "Team Spirit" military exercise in South Korea.

Aspin said the U.S. is holding discussions with North Korea and among U.S. allies on the "Team Spirit" issue and declined to give further details.

"I would mention, however, that progress on items to North Korea rests on the North's willingness to forthrightly address international concern about its nuclear program," he said.

Aspin was then asked whether there is any possibility that "the U.S. will recognize North Korea as an independent state" and "the conditions that would have to be met."

"See above," he said without elaboration.

Aspin said North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons development program is "the number one threat" to peace and security in northeast Asia.

"The prospect of North Korea with nuclear weapons, particularly with missile delivery systems, is very dangerous and destabilizing," he said.

The Pentagon said North Korea's nuclear program will be top priority on the agenda for Aspin's November 3 to 5 visit to Seoul.

Aspin will travel to South Korea after a trip to Japan where he is expected to hold talks with Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata and Defense Agency Chief Keisuke Nakanishi.

Commenting on a U.S. proposal to develop a "theater missile defense system" with Japan, Aspin said policy consultations with Tokyo are still "in the initial stages" but stressed the importance of U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the project.

"The U.S. believes ballistic missile defense is an important part of the equation in dealing with threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and the systems that deliver them," he said.

Aspin said the U.S. believes there are no legal and political barriers in U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the missile defense project, which he said is designed to cope with "the threat of limited small use of ballistic missiles."

Turning to other bilateral security issues, Aspin said the U.S. has no plans to modify the U.S.-Japan security pact because "it continues to play a vital role" in future security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region.

Aspin indicated that Washington has no plans to abandon Yokota Air Base on the outskirts of Tokyo or allow co-use of the facility with Japan, saying the base provides "a vital transportation, logistic and command and control center" for the U.S. military.

Asked whether the U.S. believes that Russians will pull out all troops from the northern territories, a chain of Russian-held islands off northern Hokkaido that are claimed by Japan, Aspin said the U.S. places its trust on the withdrawal commitment made by President Boris Yeltsin.

"We believe that he seriously intends to carry out the commitment," he said, but added that a complete Russian withdrawal "probably depends on continuing stability" in Moscow.

JAPAN

Aspin, Nakanishi Discuss DPRK Nuclear Issue

OWI/21122993 T41 KYODO in English 1214 GMT
2 Nov 93

[Text] Tokyo, Nov 2 KYODO—U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin told Japan's State Minister for Defense Keisuke Nakanishi on Tuesday [2 November] that the United States will resolve North Korea's suspected nuclear development program through high-level talks with Pyongyang.

Aspin made the remark during an hour-long meeting with the Defense Agency director general shortly after he

arrived in Tokyo for talks with Japanese leaders on security matters, a senior official said.

The two defense ministers agreed to remain in close contact on North Korea's suspected nuclear development scheme, the official said in a briefing.

North Korean and U.S. officials made informal contact in New York last week to discuss possible resumption of their high-level talks that have been shelved since July, according to a U.S. State Department official.

North Korea has rejected a request by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to allow it to inspect two sites in Yangbyon, some 40 kilometers north of Pyongyang, suspected of being part of a secret nuclear weapons development program.

Pyongyang announced in March that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but later suspended the decision following the first round of talks with the U.S.

Aspin referred to the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Program, saying Japan and the United States should make joint efforts to develop the air defense system to knock down ballistic missiles from enemy countries, the official said.

He cited options open to Japan, saying the U.S. and Japan could develop the TMD system through a joint development project through technological exchanges between the two countries or by the purchase and sale of technologies on a commercial basis, the official said.

Nakanishi told Aspin that it is very important for Japan and the U.S. to consider the political and defense issues concerning the TMD system and then make a decision on it.

Nakanishi said Japan wants to start studying the TMD program at a bilateral working-level meeting scheduled to meet Thursday.

The U.S. proposed in September that Japan and the U.S. jointly develop the TMD system against North Korea's medium-range missiles. The TMD system is designed to destroy incoming missiles while they are flying through or above the atmosphere.

In a September 27 meeting in Washington, Aspin and Nakanishi agreed to study the system within the framework of working-level consultations between defense officials.

The Japanese and U.S. Governments earlier reported that North Korea had successfully test-fired the Rodong-1 ballistic missile, which reportedly has an estimated range of 1,000 kilometers.

The Rodong-1 is reportedly able to deliver nuclear and biological warheads.

Developing the TMD system for strategic purposes would cost an estimated 1.2 billion dollars, equal to about a quarter of the annual Japan-U.S. annual trade imbalance over the next 5 years.

Aspin will leave for Seoul on Wednesday to attend the 25th annual Security Consultative Meeting between the United States and South Korea, scheduled for Wednesday to Friday.

Agreement Signed With Belarus on Nuclear Nonproliferation

OW0511131093 Tokyo KYODO in English 1253 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 5 KYODO—Japan and Belarus signed an agreement in Moscow to cooperate on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and to establish a committee for cooperation on destruction of nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus, the Foreign Ministry said Friday [5 November].

Japanese Ambassador to Belarus Sumio Edamura signed the agreement with Belarusian officials, the ministry said.

The agreement follows Japan's announcement in April at the joint ministerial meeting of the Group of Seven (G-7) nations that it would extend a grant in aid of about 100 million dollars for promotion of nuclear weapons destruction in the former Soviet Union, it said.

The committee will include representatives of the governments of Japan and Belarus and will hold its first meeting in Minsk, Belarus, next Monday and Tuesday to discuss specifics of the bilateral pact, the ministry said.

NORTH KOREA

Ackerman's Comments on Meeting With Kim Il-Song

SK0411041693 Seoul YONHAP in English 0201 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Washington, Nov. 3 (YONHAP)—Rep. Gary Ackerman, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, says he is convinced that North Korean President Kim Il-song is interested in resolving the nuclear issue.

"I firmly believe both (Kim Il-song and South Korean President Kim Yong-sam) are interested in resolving the nuclear issue," said Ackerman, who recently visited both North and South Korea.

Speaking at a public hearing held by his subcommittee on the North Korean nuclear issue, Ackerman (D.-New York) said Kim Il-song had assured him that North Korea has no nuclear weapons, no nuclear capability, no reason to develop such weapons, and no money for such a project.

But Ackerman said that he had replied with former U.S. President Ronald Reagan's famous dictum: "Trust but verify."

Ackerman said he had stressed to the North Korean leader that the U.S. congress fully supports the Clinton administration's handling of the issue, and that Americans of all parties are unanimous in supporting the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to bring North Korea into the international inspection regime.

He said he also had the opportunity to meet with South Korean President Kim Yong-sam after becoming the first

foreigner to pass from North Korea to South Korea across the "infamous" demilitarized zone.

Meanwhile, Selig Harrison, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the hearing that it is not desirable for the international community to push North Korea too hard.

Harrison suggested that in order to resolve the nuclear issue, the United States and North Korea set up a liaison office in each other's capital as a prelude to forming formal relations between the two countries.

The suggestion was one of the 10 items Harrison proposed. Others included the signing of a peace treaty, ending the Korean war, and acceptance of North Korea into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as some in Japan have suggested.

But former Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz; William Clark, senior advisor on Asia in the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and William Taylor, senior vice president of the Center, raised objections to such suggestions and expressed the need for a firmer stance on North Korea.

Vice Defense Minister Issues Press Statement

SK0311113893 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0900 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Vice Marshal Kim Kwang-chin, vice minister of the People's Armed Forces, on 3 November issued the following press statement denouncing the South Korean defense minister for his open declaration at a special interview with a broadcast reporter on 2 November that he will not hesitate to take so-called military countermeasures [kunsajok taeung], placing blame on us for our nonexistent nuclear development.

The statement of Vice Marshal Kim Kwang-chin, vice minister of People's Armed Forces, follows:

Kwon Yong-hae, South Korean defense minister, at a special interview with a broadcast reporter on 2 November, placed blame on us for our nonexistent nuclear development and declared he will not hesitate to take so-called military countermeasures.

We cannot overlook [kunyang sucho porilsu opta] that the person who is called the defense minister of a civilian government made this reckless and provocative remark. Furthermore, we must note that he made this bellicose remark one day before the annual Security Consultative Meeting with the United States. Lurking in his remark is the heinous scheme to put the brake on the exchange of special envoys between the North and the South and the DPRK-U.S. talks and to lead the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war.

Now that the South Korean authorities openly vow military countermeasures, the peaceful settlement, or the settlement through dialogue, of the nuclear issue between the North and the South has become no longer workable [tonun solchariga opke toeyotta].

As is well known, we have neither the will nor the ability to develop nuclear weapons. As a party concerned, who has been unilaterally subjected to nuclear threat over the past

decades, we have taken deeper interest than anyone else in the solution of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula.

We have made consistent efforts to solve the problem in a fair manner through dialogue. Presently, the third round of talks between the DPRK and the United States is the order of the day, and the working delegates' contact for the exchange of special envoys is under way. We treasure these talks and look forward to their good fruition. At a time like this, the South Korean person in military authority of the so-called civilian government raved about military countermeasures. By this they themselves denied the present regime is a civilian regime and totally rejected the resolution of the nuclear issue through dialogue.

This is like a cannon ball shooting out of a civilian mouth. Now that the South Korean authorities declared military countermeasures, we cannot depend on dialogue indefinitely. In the event that the dialogue process connected with the nuclear issue is ruptured, the South Korean authorities, which avoided the peaceful settlement of the issue, will be held totally responsible.

It is our position to respond to dialogue with dialogue and to war with war. We are prepared both for dialogue and war. Under the condition that the South Korean person in military authority vowed to deal with us with Armed Forces, it is unavoidable that we take countermeasures with Armed Forces. Military countermeasures mean war. Those who attack others with fire will be retaliated against with fire. Our People's Army, which defends like a fortress the well-being of the country, the people, and popular mass-centered our-style socialism, counts on its revolutionary trait to deal with fire with those who dare to attack our dignified Republic and punish them hundred- and thousand-fold. Our People's Army has a tradition of the heroic one-a-match-for-a-hundred revolutionary Army, which inflicted death and humiliating defeat whenever enemies, who turned traitor to the nation and disturbed peace in the country, commit military adventure.

If those who wield guns and bayonets against the South Korean people think that they can also wield guns and bayonets against us, they are miscalculating. Furthermore, if they think they can survive after harming others, there is nothing more foolish. The South Korean puppet defense minister's absurd outburst only foretells his own destruction and the end of the Kim Jong-sam regime, which put up a signboard of a civilian government. They should clearly know that their tragic fate is not forced upon them by us, but by the provokers' own choice. The provokers should not take actions they will regret.

'Self-Defensive Measures' To Be Taken if Sanctions Imposed

SK0611142093 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1310 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Text] A meeting with representatives of Russian publications and press organizations took place on 28 October at the DPRK Embassy in Russia on the month of support for the proposal for founding the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo [DCRK].

Present at the meeting were Nikolay Mishin, president of (Palia), a Russian publishing company; Vyacheslav Blaznin, the founder of ISTOKI, a newspaper; Mikayl Chinkov, editor-in-chief of PATRIOT, a newspaper; and other chief functionaries, reporters, and writers of publications and press organizations. DPRK Ambassador to Russia Son Song-pil and other embassy officials were also present there.

The DPRK ambassador spoke first at the meeting.

He elaborated on the details of the proposal for founding the DCRK, which the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song advanced; the details of the 10-point program of great unity of the entire nation; and their justness and significance.

Referring to the DPRK-U.S. talks, he said that the two rounds of talks so far were progressive [chonjinjok] and productive.

He also said that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula can be resolved only through talks between us and the United States. He also pointed out why the nuclear issue was raised on the Korean peninsula. He said that if any sanctions are imposed against us at the United Nations, we will consider this to be the violation of our sovereignty and take appropriate self-defensive measures [haedanghan chawijok chochirul chwihalgut].

He then answered questions.

Envoy to Moscow Explains UNGA Resolution

SK0611154093 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1000 GMT 6 Nov 93

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] A news conference was granted to Russian reporters on 5 November at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow. Son Song-pil, DPRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, lead the news conference. He made clear the DPRK's position on the allegation of the UN General Assembly [UNGA], which summed up the yearly activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Our station reporter (Aleksey Prinin) was present at the news conference.

The DPRK ambassador mainly quoted a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry.

The statement by the Foreign Ministry considers the IAEA's activities to be a provocative agitation and a provocation maneuver by forces that are hostile to the DPRK.

Ambassador Son Song-pil went on to say:

[Begin Son Song-pil recording] I want to elaborate on an attempt by some Western forces to resolve our country's nuclear issue by putting pressure, the unreasonableness of this attempt, and the South Korean authorities' reckless maneuvers over our nuclear issue.

Some Western European countries and some insidious elements have turned our nuclear issue into an international one and have insisted that this issue be resolved by putting pressure. This logic is unreasonable, of course.

However, based on this logic, they presented our issue to a general meeting of the IAEA in Vienna a while ago and had an unreasonable resolution adopted.

And, clauses concerning us were contained, unjustifiably, in a report on the IAEA's yearly activities, which the director general of the IAEA made to the 48th session of the UN General Assembly, and the so-called resolution was adopted there.

[Son Song-pil recording continues] In the resolution adopted at 48th UN General Assembly, after deliberating the IAEA director general's report about the IAEA's annual activities, there are two clauses concerning us. [end recording]

While pointing out that South Korea has prevented the DPRK-U.S. talks concerning nuclear issue from taking place, Ambassador Son Song-pil cited the statement issued recently by the DPRK People's Armed Forces Ministry. The ambassador went to say:

[Begin Son recording] I will talk more about the DPRK-U.S. talks. Two rounds of the DPRK-U.S. talks were held. A third round will be held. There are some differences of opinion between us and the United States over the third round of talks.

Now, the United States brings up the conditions that only when we return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, receive the nuclear inspections by the IAEA, and hold North-South dialogue on denuclearization, can it hold the third round of talks. These are unilateral conditions. The United States has called only on us to implement our duty. The United States has said that, after watching us implement the conditions, it will decide whether to hold the talks with us.

For the DPRK-U.S. talks to take place, there are tasks that we should conduct to resolve nuclear issues and there are also tasks that the United States should conduct. As the United States has promised in the (?second) talks, it should not make nuclear threats to us. [end recording]

After DPRK Ambassador Son Song-pil said that the South Korean Government has recently discussed the issue to produce chemical weapons, he pointed out that the DPRK Foreign Ministry has obtained relevant intelligence.

[Begin Son recording] At present, the South Korean authorities have 10 plants to produce chemical weapons. They have stored 215,000 [as heard] chemical weapons. In addition to this, the U.S. troops in South Korea possess many nuclear and chemical weapons and have deployed them in South Korea. The U.S. troops deployed [words indistinct] chemical weapons in its South Korean areas of operations. These chemical weapons have been used to increase their actual combat strength during the Team Spirit exercises.

As we see, the South Korean authorities said they would take worthless military countermeasures under the pretext of the nuclear issue and are openly producing chemical weapons. If they, by so doing, bring a nuclear cloud, a chemical weapon cloud, and a war cloud to our country, they will be held responsible for the aftermaths caused by their acts and will unavoidably be driven into a piteous destiny. [end recording]

Official on LWRS Technology Transfer, Nuclear Issue

SK0511043493 Seoul SISA JOURNAL in Korean
4 Nov 93 pp 8-9

[Article by American nuclear expert (Peter Hayes) on remarks regarding North Korea's nuclear issue made by Kim Yong-sun, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and vice-chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland in Pyongyang on 16 October]

[Text] "North Korea will remain in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] only if the issue of transferring technology of light-water moderated reactors [LWRS] is resolved," Kim Yong-sun, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and vice chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, told this writer in Pyongyang on 16 October. Kim Yong-sun added that "if this issue is not solved, North Korea will have no choice but to develop LWRS technology on its own." Such remarks made by Kim Yong-sun mean that North Korea will withdraw from the NPT if the situation goes contrary to its wishes.

Kim Yong-sun's remarks give the impression that his country intends to easily acquire assurances from the United States that it will transfer LWRS technology to North Korea, rather than attempting to acquire the LWRS technology by any other means. North Korea does not care which country provides the LWRS technology, be it the United States, Russia, Japan, or the ROK. And yet, North Korea wants the United States to provide the LWRS technology. [sentence as published] North Korea believes that if the United States provided it with the LWRS technology, this would be conducive to eliminating international political and legal obstacles blocking the transfer of technology to North Korea as stipulated in the Coordinating Committee for Export Control to Communist Area [COCOM] and the U.S. "law on regulating hostile countries."

It Is Realistically Difficult To Transfer LWRS Technology

Of course, it will be impossible for North Korea to receive assurances that the transfer of LWRS technology will take place. Atomic energy companies in the United States no longer manufacture LWRS. Furthermore, it will be difficult for the United States to take the initiative of transferring the technology to North Korea or providing financial support for it. The reason for this is that in the event U.S. atomic energy companies provide financial support to North Korea, the U.S. Export and Import Bank, which would financially guarantee them, would encounter financial difficulties due to its excessive loans.

In particular, other U.S. civilian banks would refuse to provide financial support to North Korea until it readjusts the redemption terms of its \$5 billion foreign debt. The U.S. Government cannot solve these problems, either.

The main aim of North Korea's challenge to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] is either to normalize political and economic relations with the United States or to at least increase [kyoksang] them so that it can improve relations with the rest of the world. For North Korea, the

nuclear issue is an ideal "hammer" to eliminate the political and legal obstacles hindering trade and investment with the United States and assistance to North Korea. The main benefit North Korea could obtain by threatening the NPT and the IAEA is that it would have a potentially pervasive effect on the United States.

North Korea has imposed two burdens on the Clinton administration by threatening to produce nuclear weapons: The first burden is that North Korea's nuclear development program can lead Japan and the ROK to join the nuclear race and, thus, can break up the U.S. security strategy toward East Asia. The second burden is that North Korea's threat of withdrawing from the NPT can weaken the talks scheduled for 1995 to discuss the matter on whether the terms of the treaty will be extended.

However, along with this, it seems that the North Korean leadership wants to strengthen trade and investment activities with the outside world under strict controls. Kim Yong-sun stated that "here lie important interests for the United States."

Kim Yong-sun stated: "The United States should know that if the present stalemate in solving the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula continues, Japan's militarism and an overall arms race in Asia will be accelerated and, furthermore, this will have an adverse effect on the 1995 talks to discuss the expansion of the NPT." It may be a foolish act for a small, isolated country, such as North Korea, to have a confrontation with the international community over the nuclear issue. However, Koreans tend to take risks, and because of this they always advance toward insolvency.

North Korea still lacks the ability to digest large-scale investments and assistance. North Korea also lacks public works overhead capital. Therefore, if and when North Korea rapidly increases exchanges with the outside world, its society will be headed to a collapse. This is why North Korean leaders want minimum assistance and investments from the outside world. North Korea is well aware of the effectiveness of its nuclear card. North Korean leaders are well aware that the large-scale internal adjustment of the North Korean society is totally impossible before relations with foreign countries are improved. Achieving the latter's aim is precisely the essence of North Korean leaders' nuclear strategy.

In a bid to achieve this aim, North Korea will allow an ordinary inspection [tongsang sachal] of the nuclear facilities that have already been reported to the IAEA. Kim Yong-sun told this writer on 16 October that "an ordinary inspection is needed for everyone."

First, North Korea is well aware of the fact that allowing inspections of the reported nuclear facilities and observing the nuclear safeguards agreement is an indispensable requirement for the U.S. negotiations. North Korea will probably allow within several days IAEA inspection members to replace film and other equipment installed to monitor the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.

Second, North Korea is expected to continue the dialogue with the ROK regarding overall security and bilateral matters, including nuclear inspections on the Korean peninsula.

Third, North Korea is expected to draw a clear line on the demands for a special inspection of some nuclear facilities that the IAEA has said are in question thus far. North Korea regards allowing a special inspection as an infringement upon its sovereignty. The IAEA and North Korea are expected to reach an agreement by limiting IAEA inspection members to inspect the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor core in Yongbyon, whose fuel resupply date has been delayed for a long time, and to take samples.

Lastly, North Korea seems to maintain the option of developing nuclear weapons with the present 200-megawatt graphite pile, graphite moderated reactor. It is likely that North Korea will not renounce to this option even if U.S.-North Korean negotiations over the issue of transferring technology of light-water moderated reactors to North Korea are settled. North Korea believes that maintaining its own atomic reactors, even though it receives the inspections in line with the nuclear safeguards accord, it can prevent its atomic industries from being retreated.

In addition to its domestic affairs, North Korea is also greatly concerned about the triangle relations among Japan, Russia, and the ROK and military cooperation between the ROK and Russia. In particular, North Korea is afraid of Russia's strong military capabilities.

Kim Yong-sun said: "There is no reason whatsoever for North Korea and the United States to confront each other. There is no permanent enemy or friend in the international community. The Korean peninsula is a small country surrounded by big powers."

Many Cold War-oriented people say that the improvement of relations with North Korea is very far away. But, this is not correct.

The United States and North Korea will soon turn their hostile relations into relations of "constructive engagement." It is clear that U.S.-North Korean high-level talks to be held next time will make a breakthrough, and they will be probably take place sometime in the end of November or early December.

North Korea is expected to remain in the NPT and to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities in return for the U.S. efforts to normalize political and economic relations with North Korea. North Korea is also expected to receive surveillance by the nuclear safeguards accord system and to operate its own nuclear reactors until it receives light-water moderated reactors (probably from the ROK).

The logic on all these developments in this region can be found in Kim Yong-sun's remark that "Maintaining U.S. influence in this region is in line with the interests of both the United States and North Korea."

SOUTH KOREA

Daily Cites Ackerman on Pyongyang, Seoul Visits

*SK0311035993 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
3 Nov 93 p 1*

[By KOREA TIMES correspondent Kim Chang-yong]

[Text] New York—U.S. Congressman Gary Ackerman, who visited Pyongyang last month, has observed that no

progress would be made in establishing relations between the United States and North Korea without the latter fully returning to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and opening its nuclear facilities to international inspection.

In a meeting with Korean newsmen arranged by Sunkyong America, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Sunkyong group, at the SKA building here Monday, Ackerman, Dem.-New York, chairman of the House subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs, said:

"Among many developments I saw in Pyongyang were that North Koreans were very much interested in normalization (of relations with the United States) as well as trade. In order to make it happen, we have a long way to go to resolve the nuclear issue as well as discussions between North and South Korea on unification."

"In my knowledge, no negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang are going on behind the scenes," he said. "There are discussions that are going on. But there are big differences between negotiations and discussions. We are in the midst of rather a high-stakes game and I think the position of the American government is quite clear on the nuclear issue and what we have to do to resolve it."

He viewed chances of inter-Korean economic cooperation, none the less political appeasement "very low" as long as the communist North has nuclear ambitions on the ground that no nation will deal with another under the threat of its nuclear weapons.

He met with both North Korean President Kim Il-song in Pyongyang on Oct. 12 and South Korean President Kim Yong-sam in Seoul a couple of days later.

He disclosed that he warned the Stalinist North Korean leader of a nuclear arms race in the Northeast Asian region if the North remains reluctant to allow international inspectors to come in and inspect facilities at Yongbyon, suspected by Western intelligence agencies of being clustered with concealed installations.

"One of the things I said to President Kim Il-song is that it will be unfortunate if the world came to the conclusion that North Korea has nuclear capabilities or even that North Korea has given the impression of having nuclear capabilities.

"The unfortunate part of that is we would expect that other countries in the region such as Japan might want to revive the question of their nuclear power. China has nuclear capabilities. One would expect South Korea also wants to have nuclear capabilities," he said.

He went on to say that two possibilities which he said history has taught, are that a nuclear war could break out and all parties concerned would "go bankrupt."

Ackerman, who unnerved many Koreans because of his exaggerated gestures after crossing the Korean border and his cancellation of an appointment with Deputy Premier-unification Minister Han Wan-sang in Seoul, described his action again as "ice-breaking" for peace on the divided Korean peninsula.

Apparently keeping in mind the Korean-Americans in his electoral district in New York, he added, he had asked Kim

Il-song to help them correspond with their family members in the North and he revived a positive reply.

"The process is going on now. It is a small program for a select number of people who have family members in North Korea and have not heard from them for many, many years. We will send a list of them to North Korea. North Korean President Kim Il-song said he would be willing to find their relatives," he disclosed.

Ackerman, 52, was elected to his sixth term in Congress a year ago in New York where about 300,000 ethnic Koreans reside.

YONHAP Says UN Resolution 'Endorses' Sanctions on DPRK

SK0211070293 Seoul YONHAP in English 0622 GMT 2 Nov 93

[“News analysis” by Hong Sung-wan]

[Text] United Nations, Nov. 2 (YONHAP)—Ayes 140. Abstentions nine. Nays one.

By this lopsided score Monday the UN General Assembly passed resolution 1-13, urging North Korea to "cooperate immediately with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement" on its nuclear facilities.

The sole nay came, not surprisingly, from North Korea.

Not even North Korea's closest allies supported the communist country for refusing IAEA inspections of its nuclear sites.

Among the nine countries that abstained were China, Cuba, Iraq and Vietnam, and China's abstention must be seen as a tacit aye. China was opposed to the United Nations taking up the North Korean nuclear issue, calling for its resolution through dialogue, and it also abstained from a vote on a North Korean resolution at the IAEA General Assembly in Vienna at the end of September.

The abstentions by Cuba and Iraq must also be seen as cold shoulders turned toward North Korea for its widening of the area of non-compliance with nuclear safeguards obligations.

Before the vote, North Korean Ambassador Pak Kil-yon twice attempted to revise the resolution. His offer to modify part of item No. 9 of the preamble, which contained the words "expressing its grave concern that the DPRK (North Korea) has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance," was turned down by 104 countries.

His second proposal was to change item No. 7 of the text, where it "commends the director general and the Secretariat of the agency for their impartial efforts to implement the safeguards agreement still in force between the agency and the DPRK and urges the DPRK to cooperate immediately with the agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement."

This was rejected by 106 countries.

The motion for the resolution was jointly made by 48 countries, including Australia, chairmanship of the IAEA Board of Governors, South Korea and the United States on Oct. 27.

It is significant that the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on North Korea in an overwhelming majority vote, in addition to the Security Council's similar resolution in May.

Unlike the Security Council's resolution, the General Assembly's resolution has no legally binding force but has greater political significance because it is a resolution of the United Nations as a whole.

In the resolution, the United Nations commended the IAEA for its impartial efforts to implement the safeguards accord still in force between the IAEA and North Korea, while urging Pyongyang to cooperate immediately with the IAEA "in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement." This will undoubtedly put considerable pressure on North Korea, which is trying to solve its nuclear issue through direct dialogue with the United States on the pretext of what it alleges is the IAEA's bias.

In his report, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix expressed concern that because of North Korea's refusal to receive IAEA special and ordinary inspections of its nuclear facilities, the continuity of safeguards regarding these facilities is being broken. He stressed that a country subject to IAEA inspections cannot select the scope of inspections.

With Monday's resolution, the United Nations has established its firm position on North Korea's nuclear problem. Should North Korea continue to reject IAEA inspections, it inevitably faces Security Council action. The resolution endorses the possibility of sanctions.

Sanctions Reportedly 'Inevitable' if Safeguards Break Down

SK0311105293 Seoul YONHAP in English 1005 GMT
3 Nov 93

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 3 (YONHAP)—Dialogue will end and sanctions will be inevitable against North Korea if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declares nuclear safeguards is broken, South Korea and the United States agreed Wednesday.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, in Seoul to attend the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), met with

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu and noted that the IAEA believes the safeguards activities are "damaged" rather than "broken."

"Both sides expressed concerns at what is happening," Chang Chae-yong, Foreign Ministry's Director-General for American Affairs, said after the meeting.

"We took note that IAEA Director-General Hans Blix said the continuity of safeguards on North Korea is damaged, not broken, and thus we would still try to solve the nuclear problem through dialogue," he said.

But Han and Aspin agreed that whenever the Agency declares that the safeguards is broken, the dialogue will stop and sanctions will become inevitable, Chang told reporters.

The talks that lasted nearly half-hour beyond schedule was dominated by North Korea's nuclear issue, he said. The questions raised were predictions on how Pyongyang will respond to IAEA's demand for inspections and what Seoul and Washington will do once the safeguards is broken, he said.

The North Korean nuclear situation took a bad turn as Han and Aspin were in talks. Pyongyang unilaterally announced it cancels Thursday's contact with Seoul on exchange of presidential envoys, a move understood as retaliation for the Nov. 1 U.N. resolution urging North Korea to immediately cooperate with the IAEA.

Seoul officials analyzed that Pyongyang wanted to wait until after the SCM results were out Thursday afternoon where South Korea and the United States are expected to announce their position on holding their annual joint military exercise "Team Spirit."

Tom Hubbard, deputy assistant secretary of State also in Seoul for SCM, met separately with Foreign Minister Han and said he was "deeply disappointed" at North Korea's decision to cancel the contact.

Inter-Korean dialogue is an important part to solving Pyongyang's nuclear situation, Hubbard was quoted as saying, and he regrets this negative development.

Substantial progress in North Korea-South Korea, North Korea-IAEA negotiations are prerequisites for next round of Pyongyang-Washington high-level talks.

Han and Aspin had reaffirmed in their meeting that these two preconditions are still valid.

"The most important variable right now is Blix's judgment on when the safeguards is broken," Chang said. "Seoul and Washington believe this judgment is entirely up to the IAEA."

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

Mladic Claims Croats Working on Atom Bomb

AU0511213993 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
5 Nov 93 p 10

[Unattributed report: "Croatia Is Making an A-Bomb"]

[Text] Croatia presently has everything it needs to produce its own atom bomb and is working full steam ahead on it, claims General Mladic.

In an interview to Spanish CAMBIO 16, General Mladic said that Croatia has "developed a network for smuggling nuclear material from the former republics of the Soviet Union," and that "this is very dangerous for the entire world."

In response to a remark by the Spanish correspondent that this happened 2 years ago when the U.S. Senate Commission published a report that Croatia was involved in smuggling nuclear materials, General Mladic said:

"I assure you that this smuggling of nuclear material is still going on. The Rudjer Boskovic Research Institute in Zagreb currently has the ingredients needed to produce their own bomb. They have the relevant technical and scientific means and are working full steam ahead on it."

General Mladic also claims that NATO planes are parachuting ammunition, arms, and oil to the Muslims every night. As an irrefutable proof of that, Mladic mentioned the fact that the Serbian forces captured the Milan and Faggot missile launchers and other material. "We showed it to the foreign media, but they did not report it," Mladic said.

ARGENTINA**CNEA To Conduct Resistance Tests at Nuclear Plant**

PY0211010993 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS
in Spanish 0002 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] Buenos Aires, 1 Nov (NA)—The National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) has signed an agreement with national and international organizations to conduct resistance tests on the reactor building of the Atucha-2 nuclear power plant.

The project derives from recommendations contained in the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Security

Guidelines. The tests' main purpose is to measure the resistance of the structure holding the reactor in order to develop analytical models.

Professionals from the University of Cordoba, the CNEA, ENACE SA [Argentina Nuclear Enterprise for Electric Power Plants], and the Japanese Kajima Corporation will participate—all of them signed the agreement.

According to a communique issued by CNEA today, the Japanese firm has an excellent international reputation in activities affecting research, development, technical cooperation, and consulting arrangements. It also is specialized in seismic prevention techniques because of the characteristics of Japan's soil.

Atucha-2 is located next to Atucha-1, about 100 km from Buenos Aires, and is still under construction. The resistance tests will last 30 days.

INDIA

Nuclear Cooperation Accord To Be Signed With Thailand

BK0511050093 Delhi Doordarshan Television Network in English 1615 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] India and Thailand today decided to sign an agreement shortly for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The two sides agreed to increase the bilateral trade volume to two billion U.S. dollars by 1997. These decisions were taken at the second meeting of the Thai-Indian Joint Commission for bilateral cooperation. The foreign minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, and the Thai foreign minister, Mr. Prasong Sunsiri, led their countries delegation. The foreign secretary, Mr. J.N. Dixit, and his Thai counterpart, Mr. Pracha Khunakasem, also participated in the meeting.

The two sides reviewed cooperation in different areas including joint ventures, fisheries, extradition, science and technology, and culture.

New Safeguards Pact To Keep Tarapur Nuclear Plant Operating

BK0411093093 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in English 23 Oct 93 p 16

[Rajendra Prabhu report]

[Text] New Delhi, Oct 22: The nuclear power plant at Tarapur will continue to function under a new bilateral safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] even after the existing trilateral agreement, including the United States, expires on Oct. 24. Department of Atomic Energy sources told this correspondent.

This new bilateral agreement would be an interim measure pending finalisation of another bilateral agreement with IAEA which will bring the reprocessing of the spent fuel from Tarapur, the fabrication of the fuel from the plutonium extracted from it and the running of the nuclear power plants' two reactors using the mixed uranium plutonium oxide fuel made in this country to replace the imported enriched uranium fuel.

The clearance of the interim agreement by the IAEA board last month is taken as a gesture of faith of the international agency and its board of governors which include USA, in the Indian adherence to nuclear non-proliferation even without signing any treaty in this regard.

The significance of the fact that for 19 long years after India demonstrated its nuclear detonation capability, it has not conducted any nuclear test, had begun to register in international fora like IAEA. This is contrasted in experts' meetings with the hurry in Pakistan to gain nuclear weapon status by resorting to all sorts of illegal means, including downright stealing of nuclear materials and designs.

International nuclear experts are now realising the contrast in Pakistan's hurry to acquire nuclear weapon status while its inability to domestically make even a small research

reactor. Recently, Pakistan, which claims to have its own nuclear weapon, had to import from China a small 30 KV low flux research reactor.

Compare this with what India has in research reactors alone—upto 100 MW variable neutron flux research reactor "Dhruba" was fully designed and built in this country with totally indigenous effort back in 1988.

What international fora are deliberating is the demonstrated Indian capabilities in areas like nuclear power and research. India has, for instance, recently offered to export under IAEA safeguards, research reactors with high neutron flux using U-233 fuel derived from thorium which no other country in the world has ever done.

In this context, Indian atomic energy experts are trying to work out with the IAEA a satisfactory arrangement by which the plutonium to be extracted from the spent fuel at Tarapur thermal reactors would be fully accounted for. This would put at ease America's genuine anxieties regarding use of such plutonium.

If the United States would not object to such arrangement which meets its nuclear proliferation fears, it is also because of a better understanding of Indian nuclear capabilities and aims in that country in recent days. The United States has a powerful voice in the Vienna-based IAEA governing body.

The nuclear "safeguards" which ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted to weapon purposes, are administered by the IAEA.

So far the United States had been taking the stand that India should not reprocess the spent fuel from the Tarapur unit based on the enriched uranium supplied by it.

The legal provision in the Indo-U.S. agreement on Tarapur is that there should be a "joint determination" on the safeguardability of the reprocessed material—experts point out that it does not bar India from reprocessing as such.

The United States had been hesitating to take up "joint determination" of the safeguardability of the reprocessing and instead had been opposing reprocessing itself on the ground that it was opposed to making of plutonium.

The nuclear weapons in the U.S. are known to be using plutonium which meant reprocessing had been going on. Recently, Japan had gone ahead with reprocessing and using plutonium. U.S. was unable to persuade Germany not to reprocess spent fuel.

Apparently the U.S. is now beginning to understand that in the light of difficulties in transporting all the Tarapur spent fuel rods back to that country, let alone finding a dump for them, reprocessing is the only solution. And that such reprocessing would have to take place in India. Its objections to reprocessing therefore could be counterproductive.

Besides, the spent fuel which is highly radioactive and has to be safeguarded against leakage, cannot be disposed of without reprocessing even if the plutonium byproduct is not used for anything else.

This places the U.S. in a dilemma in asking India not to reprocess the spent fuel. There is already a problem of storage of this spent fuel at Tarapur.

As a result of all these considerations, the Indian proposal to reprocess the spent fuel, extract plutonium and use it further, all under internationally acceptable "safeguards", is getting wide acceptance as the only option.

Incidentally, this also resolves the Tarapur issue which had affected Indo-U.S. relations all these years. The U.S. insistence on extending the safeguards meant for Tarapur to all nuclear installations in India, is becoming increasingly untenable in the context of India's own self-reliance in the nuclear field.

Also, Indian transparency in its nuclear programme is stated to contrast with the deception and double-talk in Pakistan.

IRAN

Businessmen Allegedly Involved in Illegal Arms Dealing

AU1511201993 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
15 Nov 93 pp 97-99

[Unattributed report: "Aggressive Offer"]

[Text] Mehdi Kashani is a businessman with many connections and a dubious past.

The Iranian learned the political trade as a minister under Ayatollah Khomeyni. He learned the trade of arms dealer in the large cities of the West. He knows Zurich and Madrid well and has left his visitor's card in the millionaire's ghetto of Beverly Hills in Los Angeles.

What does such a man expect of a piece of real estate off Federal Highway B206 in northern Germany?

Surrounded by fields and woods, the Hartenholm airfield is located near the small village of Hasenmoor on the B206. It is a site of 8 hectares, including a strip of 600 meters, nine hangars, a pub, and a provisional tower.

Until several weeks ago, hobby and business pilots met for a beer in the airfield restaurant, chatted about the weather, business, or their planes.

This changed 2 months ago when the new manager, Kashani, and his partner, Nick Ahmed Semnar, Iranian citizens resident in Rodgau near Frankfurt, took over Hartenholm. Since then, the idyllic scene has disappeared, the airfield users have had a feeling of insecurity, and some people have been scared.

Some of those who have their businesses at the airfield do not hold telephone conversations from their offices any more, out of fear that their telephones might be tapped by the Iranians. Whether or not such fears are justified, confidential talks are conducted via radio telephone in the digital network, which is considered safe.

Other Hartenholm businessmen complain about "aggressive offers" from the Iranians regarding participation in firms. Kashani and Semnar showed particular interest in a northern German air electronics firm. The firm's manager says that "we can procure anything that is available on the

civilian market of air electronics." But the man refuses to accept the Iranians as silent partners.

The security authorities apparently also view the buyers of Hartenholm with suspicion.

An official of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Kiel met with a businessman from Schleswig-Holstein on 5 November and asked him "in a casual tone" what was "going on" in Hartenholm. His colleagues from the Hamburg office had a chat with the businessman's neighbor. The Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein Land Offices of Criminal Investigation are carrying out preliminary investigations.

Until 10 September, the airfield in northern Germany belonged to the Hamburg dentist Reinhard Uhlig, 42, and his partner Heinz-Erich Schreitmueller, 38. The two had bought the airfield in 1989.

In May, Schreitmueller found a potential buyer—the Iranian businessman Musa Chajir Habibollahi from London—for main proprietor Uhlig's "burdensome Hartenholm commitment" (Uhlig).

The two agreed on the deal for approximately 10 million German marks [DM]. According to the Kiel Transport Ministry, this is a very normal deal, because "a limited liability company [GmbH] can be bought by anyone who can pay," a spokesman for the Ministry says.

Habibollahi installed as one of the two managers an old buddy of his who is known to the security authorities in the West—Mehdi Kashani.

In September 1984, Kashani had problems with the FBI in Los Angeles. His then partner in the Swiss firm Tex Consultancy and Engineering Inc., Habibollahi, had reported him to the U.S. authorities because Kashani had misappropriated \$5 million.

In March 1992, Kashani, who is resident in Madrid, was apprehended by the Spanish police. The Spanish authorities said that "the well-known arms dealer Mehdi Kashani" was caught red-handed when he was trying to channel U.S. arms electronics to Iran.

Western intelligence services believe that Kashani has close contacts to the Iranian arms procurement authority, Sasemane Sanaje Defa (Sasad) in Tehran's Pasdaran Street. Since the U.S. Administration imposed a strict embargo on the Mullah regime in 1979, Sadad has tried to procure, from the West, replacement parts and electronics components for weapons and aircraft that the United States had sold to Iran in the past.

It must have dawned on Uhlig's partner Schreitmueller, prior to the sale of Hartenholm, that his Iranian business friends could have more in mind in Hartenholm than extending the landing strip.

In a letter Schreitmueller wrote on 21 October to three banks that are involved in the Hartenholm sale, the businessman said that he was having "considerable doubts about the sincerity of the business intentions" of the Iranian group of buyers.

In the letter, which "was agreed upon with my lawyer and which I endorse," Schreitmueller reports on a meeting in Cologne on 2 September. Schreitmueller says that Mr.

Semnar had asked to meet him in Cologne where he [Semnar] suggested that he wanted "to launder 100 million pounds Sterling in cash from drug deals" through Schreitmueller's firm Nordair in Schleswig-Holstein—a claim that Semnar contradicts.

Schreitmueller and Nick Semnar are managers of Nordair Schleswig-Holstein. The commercial register gives Mehdi Kashani, resident in Madrid, as a shareholder.

IRAQ

'Thorough' UN Inspection Finds No Hidden Scuds

PM0211145793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Nov 93 First Edition p 7

[ITAR-TASS report under the "News From Around the World" Rubric: "Baghdad"]

[Text] Nikita Smidovich (Russia), leader of the UN group of inspectors in Iraq, has announced that as a result of a "thorough inspection" lasting a month, his coworkers have found none of the Scud missiles which "were allegedly being concealed by the Baghdad regime."

The head of the mission told journalists Sunday that no missiles have been found on Iraqi territory, nor have they found any other banned types of weapons. During the inspections, according to N. Smidovich, they made use of special radars installed in helicopters which "were able to locate objects hidden beneath the ground." According to U.S. and other Western intelligence data published earlier, the Iraqi authorities had concealed over 200 Scud missiles and other weapons banned by UN sanctions in various regions of the country.

Opposition Radio Names New Chemical Weapons Hiding Place

NC0411173993 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Islamic Revolution in Arabic 1430 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Our sources have cited sources in the ranks of the tyrant Saddam's Armed Forces who said that his regime recently moved the chemical weapons it had previously placed in the marshlands to another area.

The sources added that the weapons were moved at night in dozens of well-covered military trucks.

The sources said that despite the extreme secrecy surrounding the transfer of these weapons and their new locations, information was leaked that indicates that the new hiding place is the desert area in the triangle formed by the juncture of al-Diwaniyah [al-Qadisiyah], al-'Amara [Maysan], and al-Kut [Wasit] Governorates.

It is worth noting that al-Basrah marshlands, particularly (Hawr Abu-Jurji), were recently the targets of extensive chemical attacks that killed or wounded thousands of the regime's servicemen and innocent citizens.

LIBYA

JANA Political Editor Slams U.S. on CW Claims, Lockerbie

LD0511183793 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 1615 GMT
5 Nov 93

[Text] Tripoli, 4 Nov—The Voice of America Radio in its commentary which reflects the U.S. Government's views raised [the issue of] what it called Libya's program for the production of chemical weapons.

JANA's political editor made some remarks on this, saying that the Great Jamahiriya has repeatedly affirmed that it has not included in its plans a program for the production of chemical weapons and that its efforts are basically directed toward economic and social development programs.

He said that the Great Jamahiriya has always called for an international agreement to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world for the sake of saving human existence.

The political editor added that reiterating this allegation is part of the hostile campaigns of the U.S. media organs against the Libyan people aimed at discrediting the reputation of the Great Jamahiriya before world public opinion.

He said that the continuation of these media campaigns reminds us of the hostile campaigns that preceded the treacherous aggression against the Libyan people and its historic leadership in 1986.

Referring to what the Americans have been alleging regarding the participation of Thai workers in the chemical industry, JANA's political editor said that Libya has no relationship with those workers. The latter's relations are with the company which is implementing the phases of the great man-made river. The political editor expressed his regret at the continuation of the American media in reiterating that the al-Rabitah plant is the largest establishment for the chemical industry. He said that the world has become sure through the visits to the plant by official and press delegations that the plant is a plant for manufacturing medicines.

The editor referred to what the American media have been reiterating regarding the Lockerbie issue, and he said that the intransigence of the United States is what has obstructed the international community from reaching a peaceful and just solution to the Lockerbie issue by rejecting and ignoring all appeals and proposals of the international organizations, led by the OAU, the Islamic Conference Organization, and the Nonaligned Movement.

PAKISTAN

U.S. Urged To Not 'Force' Disarmament in Region

BK061111193 Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 93 p 13

[Editorial: "Ms Raphael's Agenda"]

[Text] The American Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael's visit to Islamabad comes at a crucial point in the history of US-Pakistan relations. This also happens to be a

critical juncture in the international politics of South Asia, as the Kashmiris' struggle for self-determination continues to intensify. Since the two are closely interrelated—Washington has for years taken a deep interest in the affairs of the subcontinent and Pakistan's strategic compulsions in the region have had a bearing on its ties with the US—they are bound to figure in Ms Raphel's discussions with her hosts. One hopes that this occasion will provide the opportunity for the two sides to discuss threathbare the issues which have prevented them from keeping their ties on an even keel. For there is no denying the fact that since 1990 when the Bush administration cut off aid under the Pressler Amendment, their relations have run into an impasse.

The major difficulty in Pakistan-American relations has been the failure of the two sides to develop a common perception of their ties. Thus the US believes that the nuclear issue is the key factor in its ties with Islamabad. This has been the case since the mid-seventies when America's excessive but selective concern for nuclear non-proliferation in the Third World has come to dominate its dealings with Pakistan. Convinced that Islamabad's nuclear programme is designed for military purposes, the United States has been demanding a roll-back and has resorted to pressure tactics of all kinds, creating serious strains between them. But for Pakistan the more important issue is the security environment in South Asia on which its survival depends. Islamabad has linked the nuclear question to the state of international relations in South Asia. The US has preferred not to admit the connection between the two but the fact is that the interrelationship between Pakistan's nuclear programme and its equations with New Delhi are all too apparent to be ignored. As long as issues such as Kashmir continue to vitiate Indo-Pakistan ties and an arms race drives them on to build up their defence capabilities, it is unrealistic to expect either of them to sign the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and renounce the nuclear option.

Until now, Pakistan's policy has been directed at persuading the US to adopt an even-handed stance on South Asia. Washington's failure to do so has only aggravated the instability and tension in the region, although the end of the Soviet-American conflict in Afghanistan and the superpower confrontation on a global level should have created conditions conducive to peace and security. Moreover, the unresolved conflicts between the countries of this region have prevented them from moving towards a disarmament regime. Without a grasp of this fact and without a serious conflict resolution initiative, American policy in South Asia will always lack realism and a clear-cut direction.

With the US relieved of the pressures of cold war competition, Ms Raphel should now find herself in a better position to place Indo-Pakistan relations in their correct perspective. This should not be difficult for her given the Clinton Administration's willingness to modify its perceptions of the region, as was evident from its recent statement recognising the disputed status of Kashmir. Once the US has a better understanding of Indo-Pakistan relations, the American position on the nuclear issue could become more realistic. The US must understand that the first priority in the region is to resolve the issues which have led the two countries to adopt such a confrontationist

approach vis-a-vis each other. Kashmir should be at the head of Ms Raphel's agenda. She has already spoken about the possibility of American mediation. She should pursue this further.

After a beginning has been made towards resolving the Kashmir dispute, the denuclearisation process can also be taken up. An attempt to isolate the nuclear issue from Pakistan's security concerns is futile. Once the Kashmir dispute is out of the way and Pakistan's relations with India are normalised, there is no reason why the two countries should hesitate to consider disarmament measures, including the signing of the NPT. Ms Raphel might recall that SALT-II reached a dead end because of Afghanistan. The INF and START could succeed only after Mr Gorbachev's glasnost had transformed US-USSR relations. Hence, the American goal in South Asia should be to help resolve the conflicts which keep India and Pakistan at loggerheads and locked up in a frenzied arms race rather than force a disarmament process without any progress on the political front.

Restrictions on Transfer of Nuclear Technology Criticized

BK0311025593 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 0200 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] At the United Nations, Pakistan has reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and criticized restrictions imposed on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Participating in the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Pakistani delegate Ahmed Kamal said that the steps to impose arbitrary and unwarranted restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes are very worrisome. Such thinking is based on narrow-mindedness and a superiority complex. He added that Pakistan has advanced many proposals to make South Asia a region free of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is ready to consider any proposal that is non-discriminatory.

NAWA-I-WAQT Editorial Views Ties With United States

BK0211151593 Karachi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 23 Oct 93 p 10

[Editorial: "Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Prerequisites of National Interests"]

[Text] While addressing a function in Karachi, John Monjo, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, said: "Pakistan and the United States have been good friends. There may be some differences between friends, but in spite of that, Pakistan and the U.S. have been moving forward on the path of cooperation. The U.S. wants a solution to the nuclear issue all over the world. The Simla agreement can provide a basis for India-Pakistan negotiations on several issues, including Kashmir and the nuclear program, in the Indian subcontinent."

On the other hand, an official of the U.S. Department of State has said in Washington that Washington is analyzing newly elected Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's address to the nation, in which she has described Pakistan's nuclear program as a program of national interest. A NEW YORK TIMES commentator stated that Bhutto's statement is a

cause of concern for the Clinton administration and it reflects the gap in Pakistan-U.S. relations.

John C. Monjo, the Pakistan-based U.S. ambassador, has categorically stated at a Karachi function that "the days are gone when Pakistan used to get military aid from Washington. Now Pakistan should try to attract U.S. investors toward it."

Pakistan-U.S. relations have always witnessed ups and downs and the United States made friendly overtures toward Pakistan mostly to serve its own interests; and as soon as its interests were served. Washington did not wait for a moment to ignore Islamabad. The period during the Afghanistan war is noteworthy in the history of Pakistan-U.S. relationship. During that period, Washington maintained close and solid cooperation with Pakistan in spite of latter's nuclear program, emerging religiosity, and imposition of martial law in the country; but soon after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower, the U.S. turned away from Pakistan and started to dislike Islamabad's nuclear program, branded religiosity as fundamentalism and fanaticism, described drug smuggling as an abominable crime, and thus suspended economic and military aid to Pakistan and refused to supply F-16 aircraft even though it had already received payments in accordance with the deal.

The nuclear program tops the list of irritants in the Pakistan-U.S. relations. Pakistan has always stressed the need for viewing this issue in the national and regional perspective. The shortage of energy in Pakistan is not hidden from anyone and India's nuclear preparations are as glaring as the sun. Pakistan needs the nuclear capability to use it for peaceful purposes and also as a "deterrent" to keep India from aggression. Pakistan has reiterated over and over again its willingness to abandon its nuclear program if India also does the same; but without checking India. Pakistan will not do away with its nuclear capability, because doing so will be tantamount to signing one's own death warrant. Pakistan's sincerity in this matter is borne out by the fact that it has proposed at international forums that the Indian Ocean region be declared as a nuclear-free zone; and during his tenure as prime minister, Nawaz Sharif had called for convening a five-nation conference, which was appreciated by the United States itself.

India, however, never gave a positive response to any of our proposals. Pakistan has already convinced the world that it is not capable of meeting an Indian military threat only with its conventional forces and weapons and that is why the nuclear program is indispensable for it. The U.S. however, has made it a prestige issue, while it has turned a blind eye to the nuclear programs of Israel, South Africa, and Mexico etc. even though they have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Lately, the United States has also started to point its fingers toward the advancement of Islam in Pakistan and has been threatening to declare it as a fundamentalist and terrorist state; and according to certain reports, attempts are being made to shift the blame for the New York World Trade Center bombing onto Pakistani fundamentalist elements. Currently, the United States—the sole superpower in the new world order—is manipulating things everywhere. It has persuaded Yasir 'Arafat to accept Israel's hegemony through the Israel-PLO agreement. However, it will be a mistake on the part of the United States to consider Pakistan a movement like the PLO and try to dictate terms to it. Pakistan came into being in 1947 as a result of a glorious movement under the leadership of great leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah and now it is a vital entity and the United States will never be able to find a Yasir 'Arafat here, who blindly will accept Washington's terms. It is also not in the U.S. interest to make Pakistan an insignificant vassal of India in the region. The fact is that Pakistan's national policies do not change with the change of governments and whether it is Kashmir or the nuclear policy, or India-Pakistan relations, or any other issue, every Pakistani Government is bound to keep the national interest above everything else and it is not possible for any government to compromise national interests.

There are apprehensions that the sole aim of bringing the Pakistan People's Party into power through an unnecessary election is that the United States wants to get a "special" agenda completed by this government. We, however, consider it necessary to make it clear to the United States and the new government that compromising national interests is not an easy affair in Pakistan nor is it in the interest of the United States itself. Therefore, any attempt to make Pakistan's national independence and sovereignty meaningless will never succeed.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Russia Gives Ukraine Deadline on Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

L1053124893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1217 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 5 TASS—Russia insists that in conformity with bilateral accords the pullout of nuclear weapons from Ukraine for their dismantling in Russia shall start on January 1 1994 and warned that otherwise a catastrophe is possible because of the poor technical state of the warheads.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, leaving on Friday for Odessa to negotiate with his Ukrainian counterpart Anatoliy Zlenko told ITAR-TASS that the latest data received from Ukrainian sources is alarming because the poor technical state of Ukrainian nuclear warheads, namely the concentration of hydrogen in them, may cause a catastrophe "more dreadful than the Chernobyl one."

"We want that Ukraine begins transferring all nuclear charges [to Russia] from January 1", as it had been agreed by the presidents of the two countries, according to Kozyres.

"We have got only 24 months to dismantle them, this is technical time," the minister stressed and warned that a new Chernobyl may occur if the deadline is not observed.

RUSSIA

Defense Minister Explains Nuclear Policy

R10411164793 Rome L'1 REPUBLICA in Italian 4 Nov 93 14

(Report on Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's 3 November news conference with unidentified correspondents by Enrico Franceschini in Moscow: "Atomic Weapons—Russia Has Second Thoughts")

[Excerpt] [Introductory passage omitted]

Grachev: The new military doctrine approved this week confirms that Russia does not consider any state as an enemy. It also rules out the use of force, except in self-defense. Our nuclear weapons are a political deterrent for preventing aggression.

Correspondent: So is that a commitment not to use them?

Grachev: We would not use them against a country that does not have nuclear arms, with two exceptions: First, if a country attacks Russia or its allies and it has a reciprocal aid pact with a country that does have nuclear arms; second, if an alliance between a nonnuclear country and a nuclear country attacks Russia.

Military Doctrine

Correspondent: Let us take the example of a country with nuclear weapons, such as the United States. In the past, the arrangement was that the USSR's nuclear weapons could only be used in response to a nuclear attack. Can you use them first today?

Grachev: I repeat: Russia—with the two exceptions I mentioned—will not use its own nuclear weapons against countries that do not have nuclear weapons. The new military doctrine says nothing about countries that do have nuclear arms. Indeed, this is a new concept.

Correspondent: Why do you renege on the agreement made by Brezhnev's USSR?

Grachev: The USSR was another country, in another time. Russia is a different country, and times have changed.

Correspondent: THE NEW YORK TIMES has reported that there is a supercomputer in Moscow capable of launching a nuclear attack without any human intervention. Is this true?

Grachev: That is science fiction. I can guarantee you that the unauthorized use of nuclear arms is impossible, because our control systems are perfect. No single person can launch nuclear missiles, not even the president.

Correspondent: The new military doctrine makes provisions for the use of the Armed Forces to restore order in the event of armed revolt. Would this decision be made after the Army has attacked the parliament with cannons?

Grachev: The doctrine was prepared before 3 October, but the events of recent days highlight the correctness of our decisions. Russia's new situation has led us to plan for new functions to be carried out by certain units of the Armed Forces. For instance, they can be used—in addition to the regular police units—to deal with armed conflicts within the country.

Correspondent: What about the use of the Armed Forces outside Russia, in the republics of the former USSR?

Grachev: They may be used for peacekeeping operations. In our view, total nuclear war or a world war with conventional weapons are still highly unlikely, even if the possibility has not completely disappeared. For the time being, however, the major threat to peace and stability comes from regional and local conflicts.

A Tissue of Lies

Correspondent: The papers are saying that you will soon be replaced, since the president and prime minister are dissatisfied with your conduct: Apparently they had a hard time convincing you to order the assault on the parliament.

Grachev: I can assure you that I will not hand it, my resignation on 7 November, as reported in a Moscow newspaper. Moreover, neither Yeltsin nor Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have anything to complain about as regards the way the Defense Ministry is run. Those are all lies that have been circulated.

Correspondent: Do you deny that the Armed Forces were uncertain and divided during the October crisis?

Grachev: There were no disagreements whatsoever within the Armed Forces leadership. There was, however, a prudent attitude, cautiousness aimed at avoiding the worst. My colleagues made various proposals as to how to react, but they were all aimed at carrying out the task at hand, and that is what we did.

Correspondent: Is it true that you think human rights should be a condition for withdrawing Russian troops from the Baltics?

Grachev: Yes it is, and I think I am right. Within 6 months there will be no more Russian troops at all in the Baltics, if there are guarantees that human rights will be respected in those regions and that the Russian ethnic minorities will not be discriminated against. Lithuania has resolved the problem, and our troops have been completely withdrawn from its territory. Why do Latvia and Estonia not do the same?

Correspondent: Will you allow Army officers to be elected in the new parliament, as was the case in the old parliament?

Grachev: I personally have nothing against it. Everybody should busy himself with what he is good at: Let the military people take care of military matters, and let the politicians take care of politics. However, my personal opinion, which is just a recommendation, is that generals and officers who are candidates should not lose their rights in the Army.

Correspondent: What do you think of expanding NATO to include the countries of Eastern Europe?

Grachev: Applying to join is a domestic matter for sovereign countries, and something in which Russia will not interfere at all, although we do have our opinions about NATO. We do not share the idea that it should be expanded, since it is not a political alliance, but a political and military alliance. This means that it must resolve problems that are not just political, but also military. So, one should ask oneself: What is the purpose of adding new members to NATO? Against whom? However, we favor new forms of cooperation and a partnership between NATO, Russia, and the countries of Eastern Europe—something which is already under way.

New Government Provision on Weapons-Related Exports

LD011113093 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 0415 GMT 1 Nov 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] The Russian Government has introduced a new procedure for trading in goods and services, which could be used for the production of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The measures adopted will make it possible to prevent unauthorized export and re-export from Russia of goods for the aforementioned purpose. The provision, ratified by the Russian Government, enables, *inter alia*, effective control to be established over the export and import of dual-purpose goods, without infringing the rights of foreign-trade organizations.

Kozyrev Believes Ukraine Committed to START I, NPT

LD0611225093 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Text] The Russian Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, believes that Ukraine is committed to its intention to ratify

the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START I. Kozyrev made the statement after 2 days of talks with his Ukrainian counterpart, Anatoliy Zlenko, in Odessa. The Russian foreign minister said he understood the Ukrainian parliament's concern about the country's national security. Kozyrev said that Russia was prepared to give Ukraine such guarantees after the removal of nuclear arms from Ukraine.

Continuing Military Nuclear Cover-Ups Alleged

PM0211125993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 29 Oct 93 p ii

[Article by Captain First Rank (Retired) Ilya Kolton: "Operation 'Radiation'—Who Is Helping To Keep Us All in Radioactive Darkness?"; from the 'Retsept' section]

[Text] It is not the first time this theme has appeared in "Retsept." The publication on the pages of our section (in abridged form) of the famous "White Paper," in which material on the tragic "interaction" between arms and military hardware and nature, and in particular on the waste products from military activity, their burial at sea, and so on, appeared so openly for the first time, had tremendous repercussions both at home and abroad. Likewise, we have reported on the efforts of the Ecological Council led by Presidential Adviser A. Yablokov geared toward exploiting the defense sector's might for the benefit of nature.

Today Captain First Rank (Retired) Ilya Kolton, candidate of technical sciences, presents his own interesting article on a theme of incalculable importance to us all—the tragic contradiction between military might, nature, and the health of the individual, military and civilian alike. An experienced military expert is sounding the alarm. His warning signal should be heeded.

[Kolton begins] The long-drawn-out arms race marathon ended in failure for us. Moreover, the failure resides not so much in what we lost out in practical terms on every combat component of the arms and military hardware we accumulated, destroying the country's economy in doing so through the disproportionate investment of budget resources, as in the fact that all this (particularly vehicles [nositelii] carrying nuclear power sources and nuclear, chemical, and other types of weapon) posed enormous dangers both to military personnel, as well as to nature, and the civilian population's environment. This happened, I believe, because during the Soviet period the military sphere and defense industries always remained a closed sphere, and that includes for the state. Everything was farmed out to the monopolist and unwieldy military-industrial complex—a kind of self-devouring structure, combining within it all the basic functions: commissioner, manufacturer, and inspector of ships, arms, and military hardware. And this military-industrial complex, under the cover of and in cahoots with the CPSU Central Committee which reared it, determined the fate of our country, supplying the Army and Navy with arms and military hardware which were not just non-battle-worthy but also a danger to its own personnel and the population of the country.

Without the state to watch over them, the army and industrial generals, in their aspiration to fire over ever greater distances, to submerge ever deeper under water, and so on (according to the principle of: "We have the strength, we don't need reason"), were not only unable to guarantee optimum basic combat qualities in the arms being newly created, but they also consigned to oblivion all questions of reliability, operational safety, and the destruction, recycling, and burial of spent waste products harmful to the human habitat. These questions were always resolved according to the residual principle whereby, although references to reliability frequently creep into draft documentation and expert evaluations of reliability and safety are conducted back at the design stage, little of this is actually carried through. A striking and recent example of this is the signing of the START II Treaty which, without a preliminary ecological study of the stages of destroying, recycling, and burying missile warheads and rocket fuel, could result for our country in its transmutation into a contaminated wasteland.

I spent 36 years in the Armed Forces, for 29 of which I was "closely involved with the reactor" on nuclear submarines in virtually every engineering capacity—from commander of a power plant remote control group [gruppa distantsionnogo upravleniya energetikoy] to representative (tester) for the Standing Commission for State Quality Control of Naval Ships. Therefore I want to explain how this is done in the Navy, and the fatal point at which we have arrived as a result.

Here is an extract from a report by the Main Military Prosecutor's Office to USSR Defense Minister S.L. Sokolov dated 17 September 1986: "...In recent times, the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry [Minsudprom] has supplied, and the Navy has taken receipt of, 27 ships and submarines, of which 22 are undergoing additional modifications... In 1980, the Kirov heavy guided missile cruiser constructed at the Baltic Plant named for S. Ordzhonikidze was received from the production unit in a technically defective, incomplete condition, and without having undergone a number of tests. Some systems and items have not been put right to this day, and it is standing idle pending repairs by the shipyard. Nevertheless, when the acceptance document was signed the enterprise was paid...99.9 percent of the cruiser's cost... On Minsudprom's initiative, 3,000 people were awarded state honors, including 13 officials from the quality control commission. Three received the title of 'Hero of Socialist Labor'... The certificates spoke of 'the thorough verification by them of the proper working order of all the ship's systems and its capacity for efficient operation, with a high degree of weapons delivery reliability.' ...Acceptance documents are signed under pressure from the manufacturers, even when expert conclusions on a ship's deficiencies are present... The offenses committed amount to a crime on the part of specific officials. Criminal proceedings were instigated 15 September 1986 under Articles 170 and 260 of the RSFSR Criminal Code."

A 6 October 1986 disaster poured oil onto the flames: A K-219 sank, taking with it 15 ballistic missiles and nuclear torpedoes. It was decided to "prepare a question for the Politburo." That "historic" session took place 25

December 1986 under the chairmanship of M.S. Gorbachev. And the next day, 26 December, the Prosecutor's Office received instructions to discontinue criminal proceedings in respect of more than 10 top officials.

Wouldn't you think that after this "historic" event at least something might have changed for the better? In 1988, eight submarines, 16 surface ships, and three auxiliary ships with serious flaws, defects, and contraventions of the law were added to the Navy's effective combat strength. And grim reality inevitably settles its accounts: explosions of live missiles, disasters involving aircraft, nuclear submarines, and surface ships, and fires at arms and ammunitions depots became an everyday occurrence in the country's Armed Forces.

In recent times alone there has been a whole number of major accidents and disasters involving the Navy (and these are only the ones it has not been possible to conceal). The explosion of solid-propellant missiles on a heavy underwater cruiser; the fire on board the Frunze nuclear cruiser; the devastation by fire and flooding of compartments of the Admiral Zakharov ASW; a fire at an ammunitions depot in Vladivostok; the explosion of a high-pressure air compressor on a nuclear submarine... The real reasons for all these accidents and disasters have not been explained, nor have the guilty parties been punished.

Obviously, the failure to assemble reliable information about accidents and disasters involving arms and military hardware, and the absence of an in-depth scientific approach to analyzing their causes and drawing up preventive measures, suit the military-industrial complex and the Defense Ministry, reluctant to wash their dirty linen in public.

The complexity of the problem consists in the fact that even after August 1991 the military and industrial generals at fault here remained in key positions of power or even advanced within the service. As a result, our society and its leading state figures have once again been confronted with the "iron" information curtain which for many years concealed, and continues to conceal, the truth about what goes on in the Army and Navy. The Russian Federation Government Committee for the Affairs of Servicemen and Members of Their Families, set up in June 1992 on the initiative of soldiers' mothers, was abolished come September 1992. Was this not because it had the authority to elaborate proposals to establish the reasons for the deaths of and injury to servicemen and military construction workers, and to monitor compliance with legislative acts, state programs, and government decrees and directives on the basis of systemic analysis of reasons for the deaths of and injury to servicemen in accidents and disasters involving arms and military hardware? So it is that a powerful lever of influence over the Army on the part of society (the soldiers' mothers) and the state was removed. And so it is that I believe the generals did away with the first ever state (supradepartmental) organ of control over the safety of military service, which could have been a mechanism for implementing a package of military laws, including the Law "On Safety," in the sphere of safeguarding a basic constitutional right—a serviceman's right to life and health in peacetime.

The Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety [Gosatomnadzor], set up under the Russian Federation president in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, is stymied at present: It is denied access to military facilities. But you know, prior to Chernobyl we had three of our own "Chernobyls" on board nuclear submarines which very few people know about. And if they had known, the "grand" Chernobyl might never have happened. I will try to demonstrate this in the tragic fate of our own nuclear submarine fleet, with which I had occasion to cross those first underwater miles on the first nuclear submarine back in era of the USSR, and to complete the underwater epic on the latest third generation nuclear submarines. The basic problem, the main calamity which has existed from the early days of using submarines and which exists right up to the present day, is the poor reliability and high danger levels of nuclear power installations and shipboard electric-power systems. This relates primarily to high-volume discharges from steam generators and the primary circuit of a reactor installation, the formation of cracks in structures housing the heat-generating elements of a reactor's core, and the inadequate reliability of the reactor control and protection system.

As a rule, this has led to major radiation accidents and disasters, killing and injuring personnel, to the dumping of large quantities of radioactive water into the sea, and to ruinous material damage.

I myself had to take part in a fight for survival on several occasions when containing and eradicating the effects of radiation accidents:

- in October 1959 on the first nuclear submarine, when carrying out the first nuclear voyage, and in August 1962 soon after returning from a voyage to the North Pole;
- In September 1975 on a strategic nuclear underwater cruiser.

The tragedy of the Komsomolets submarine once again demonstrated the total bankruptcy of fire-fighting systems and complete inefficiency of emergency life-saving installations. In the 35 years of the nuclear submarine fleet's existence, three generations of submarines have succeeded one another and several dozen series of nuclear submarine have been built, but little has changed in questions of safety of service on board submarines. During my period of service with the Naval Quality Control Commission, I raised this question time and again, demanding that checks (evaluations) of the reliability of a ship being constructed be carried out at the stage of official testing.

However, I was alone in my demands because the Navy's Main Shipbuilding Administration, in contravention of its purpose, did not protect the interests of the fleet and its people. My idea to include "reliability" within the program of official testing under a separate item did not get through. The driving force behind the refusal was that, allegedly, the short space of time given over to conducting official tests meant that an evaluation of reliability could not be accurate or objective. Nevertheless, when taking receipt of the first [golovnoy] submarine strategic cruiser (Typhoon), implementing my right as leader of the electromechanical section of the government commission, I succeeded in proving that this evaluation was not only possible, but very necessary.

At that time this evaluation was carried out in the turbine section with reference to all three components of reliability (service life, maintainability, resilience) and it turned out that the ship built did not meet the stated demands for reliability. The first Typhoon was added to the Navy's effective combat strength even though it could not fire torpedoes, and so on.

A full 30 months have passed since the reopening of criminal proceedings in respect of the Komsomolets (and over four and a half years since it went down), but no end to the investigation is in sight. The case regarding the Komsomolets, if it is conducted according to the law from start to finish, will be unprecedented. It is for this reason that it is, I believe, very important to accord this case the highest status, including via the involvement of independent observers and experts. Rejections of our repeated appeals to the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office for an increase in the number of observers on this case look strange to say least if the Prosecutor's Office seriously intends to establish the truth on this occasion.

A great deal of the trouble, I believe, is that the Law "On Safety," which was adopted over 18 months ago, is not working in terms of ensuring safety during military service. There is no mechanism for its implementation. The rise of unaccountability and impunity is more than eloquently confirmed by the fact that no top officials have been rendered criminally accountable for the massive deaths of personnel and the billions in damage inflicted on the environment during accidents and disasters involving arms and military hardware since 1960. This attitude toward the supply of ships and vessels carrying missiles, nuclear weapons, and nuclear power sources appears criminal, as the failure to adopt urgent and strict measures threatens disaster, which includes ecological disaster, as well as the deaths of people.

The history of my unsuccessful battle with the existing situation warrants a separate discussion. The attention with which Presidential adviser A. Yablokov reacted to my appeal recently is encouraging. His response to my appeal contains two important elements: He considers it necessary to discuss military problems in the Security Council (and to submit my findings to it). Other problems—ecology and life, the health of military and civilian personnel—should be subjected to in-depth research by a special scientific-practical conference, to which, if it takes place, I have been asked to report. I agree to any report, in front of any audience, if only it will halt or prevent the death of the environment and of mankind.

Stop Press: According to official data, up to 30 percent of the damage to the environment is brought about by the results of military activity.

Around 42 million tonnes of jet fuel (25 percent) is used for military purposes. But its combustion is one of the main causes of pollution of the atmosphere.

The transportation of military loads, especially along pipelines, represents an enormous danger to the environment and to mankind in particular. Around half of military pipelines and storage facilities constructed at the beginning of the 1950's are worn in the extreme, and highly dangerous to the natural world.

A Directorate of Ecology has been set up in the Russian Defense Ministry. There are chairs of ecology in military academies. And 141 environmental protection inspectors are currently serving in the Russian Armed Forces.

Forces Authorized To Strike First Under Nuclear Threat

AU0311120793 Paris AFP in English 1126 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, Nov 3 (AFP)—Russia's armed forces are authorised to strike first with nuclear weapons in case of an external nuclear threat, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev said Wednesday.

Grachev was giving details at a press conference of the military doctrine adopted Tuesday by the Russian Security Council.

He said that nuclear weapons could be used "first, in case of an attack by a (non-nuclear state) that is in alliance with a nuclear power against the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces and the troops of its allies."

In the second case, Russia could strike first "in case of a joint action by states possessing nuclear weapons to attack or sustain an offensive against Russia or its allies," Grachev said.

Security Council's Lobov Describes Military Doctrine

*PM0311185793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Nov 93
First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Russian Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov by Vasiliy Kononenko; date, place not given: "Russia's Military Doctrine Contains No Obligation To Refrain From Being First To Use Nuclear Weapons":—first two paragraphs are introduction; last paragraph is a postscript]

[Text] The Basic Guidelines of Russia's Military Doctrine, adopted 2 November at a sitting of the Russian Security Council and ratified by President Boris Yeltsin, contain many surprises. One of them is that the text of this document does not contain the obligation, which the leaders of the former Soviet Union declared in their political statements, that Russia will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Our correspondent Vasiliy Kononenko spoke to Russian Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov.

Lobov: Work on the military doctrine began back in April. But the approaches have changed. For instance, events in Moldova, Tajikistan, and Georgia, certain changes in Ukraine's stance on nuclear weapons, a change in the situation within the country, the conversion program—all these required specific amendments to the doctrine. Of course the October mutiny forced us to speed up work on this document. All Security Council members made their proposals and signed the document.

Kononenko: Which provisions were the subject of the main differences of opinion?

Lobov: The experts' analysis on the question of Russia using nuclear weapons proved to be the most lengthy. The basic approach here is that nuclear war in the present conditions is senseless. Even if you do not use nuclear

weapons you can destroy nuclear reactors, and huge areas of the world will be in the nuclear destruction zone.

Russia advocates the elaboration of a system of collective security which would guarantee the prevention of war—both nuclear and conventional. But if such a war is nevertheless unleashed against Russia and its allies, then we will have the right to use all the resources we have at our disposal to protect our vital interests. This approach was elaborated collectively.

Kononenko: When conflicts have emerged within the country, the Army has repeatedly found itself in an ambiguous position. Have its role and functions been defined at long last?

Lobov: Yes, the cases in which the Armed Forces can come into operation in internal conflicts have been defined. Proceeding from the premise that the security of Russians and the state as a whole comes first, the doctrine presupposes the use of Army subunits, Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, Border Guard Troops, and other troops in cases when all other material and human resources have been exhausted. For example, in Tajikistan, to which we are tied by the relevant treaty, there have proved to be insufficient border guard troops, and other Army subunits have been put into operation. Troops can also be used in the event of the threat of a terrorist act in respect of a nuclear electric power station, major chemical enterprises, or main transport routes. The president can adopt such a decision.

An important aspect of the doctrine is the state's responsibility for the social protection of the Armed Forces and the serviceman as an individual. This must be stipulated by Russian Federation laws.

As far as cutbacks in the Army are concerned, then the document outlines this. Furthermore, the Armed Forces should be mobile, equipped with state-of-the-art weapons and hardware. Means of individual protection and combat should be provided for every serviceman, including a reliable bullet-proof vest, a night vision apparatus, and effective weapons. This is state policy. Specific programs should follow in its wake.

Kononenko: The military doctrine that has been adopted is only one element of the extensive and strictly secret work which is being conducted in the structures of the Security Council. The Former Supreme Soviet repeatedly called into question the competence of this organ's decisions. To what extent is it nevertheless legitimate?

Lobov: Let us start with the basic document which is called the Russian Federation Law on Security. It says that the objects which the state is called upon to protect are the individual, his rights and freedoms, society, its material and spiritual assets, and the state and its constitutional system and territorial integrity. Amendments concerning the status and purpose of the Security Council have also been included in the draft of the new Constitution by the Constitutional Conference Working Commission. Thus, this organ is constitutional both according to the old Basic Law and the new one. [Lobov ends]

Following O. Lobov's appointment as Security Council secretary, its apparatus has been reorganized. Ten interdepartmental commissions have been formed. Before, there

were five. These commissions are the basic working organs of the Security Council, and they ensure that strategic problems are considered and resolved in the sphere of military, economic, environmental, and information security, health protection, the fight against crime and corruption, and public security.

Government To Adhere To Nuclear Tests Moratorium

LD2910175093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1722 GMT 29 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations October 29 TASS—Russia proclaimed its adherence to the nuclear tests moratorium, in spite of an underground nuclear blast staged by China, said a statement of the Russian Government circulated on Friday in the United Nations headquarters as an official document of the General Assembly.

"The government of the Russian Federation expresses profound regret over the nuclear test staged by China. It is remarkable that the test was carried at a time when the world came to a truly unique opportunity to get rid of nuclear testing once and for all. Thus ignored were the appeals of many countries, including Russia, not to break the silence at the testing ranges all over the world," the document said.

"In these circumstances the government of the Russian Federation announces its adherence to the moratorium and calls for other states to follow the example. Nevertheless the Russian Federation reserves the right to revise the decision on the moratorium if further unfavourable developments occur in this sphere," the document stressed.

Official Comments on Inspections of Nuclear Installations

LD3010064293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2225 GMT 29 Oct 93

[From the "Politburo" program]

[Text] "Politburo" has spoken about the problem of monitoring nuclear installations more than once. Unfortunately, the problem is not losing its topicality. Until recently, Gosatomnadzor—which was set up in Russia in 1991 with the task to carry out the nongovernmental supervision of nuclear installations—has been meeting with clandestine opposition on the part of the heads of the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, and the Russian Committee for the Defense Industry.

Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of Gosatomnadzor, has repeatedly approached the heads of the military-industrial complex with a demand to coordinate the dates for inspections. The ministers simply are not replying to any of his requests, however, one of which was addressed to Pavel Grachev personally. We hope that an instruction on federal supervision of nuclear and radiation safety signed a few days ago by Russian President Boris Yeltsin will make it clear to the power ministries that guaranteeing the nuclear safety of the country is not their internal affair.

[Begin Vishnevskiy recording] We have set ourselves the task of completing the inspection of all nuclear and radiation installations by 1 November. We have practically fulfilled it. By 1 December, we are supposed to prepare our conclusions on the results of the inspection and to report these conclusions to the president, as well as to the government. [end recording]

New Military Doctrine Redefines Nature of Threat

LD0311154693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1447 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—"Russia does not consider any state as a potential enemy," Valeriy Manilov, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, said.

Speaking at a news conference in Moscow on Wednesday, Manilov said that Russia's new military doctrine includes a new system of evaluation which envisions a classification of threats which either exist or are possible. "This is the basis for building a model of reaction to preclude, prevent or thwart such threats," Manilov said.

He believes that threats to Russia's security may come from the presence of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery in other states, proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and territorial claims on Russia and its allies.

The text of the Russian military doctrine will not be published. Manilov stressed. However, he did not rule out the possibility that some of its provisions may appear in the press.

He added that the 23-page document is being currently studied by the president and some members of the Russian Security Council. He noted that the mechanism of its implementation has yet to be worked out. He said the president will not address the nation on this issue this year because of the "complex political situation in the country."

KAZAKHSTAN

Nuclear Device at Semipalatinsk Test Site Causes Concern

LD0411223493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0915 GMT 4 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Fedor Ignatov]

[Text] Almaty, 4 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—The fate of a nuclear device which was buried in 1989 in shaft no. 108 of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground will, it seems, soon be decided. According to Major-General Fedor Safonov, deputy head of the testing ground in charge of scientific work, Arzamas-16 [nuclear research center in Gorkiy oblast] is now "simulating options for destroying this dangerous device. As soon as an additional access shaft has been sunk, specialists from Kazakhstan and Russia will determine its condition and decide which of the proposed methods of destruction should be used."

Four years ago everything was ready for a routine test involving the nuclear device, when President Nursultan

Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan issued a decree closing the proving ground and terminating nuclear tests at it. Under the circumstances the military decided not to risk exploding the device and left it buried in the shaft.

According to today's issue of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, Boris Litvinov, chief designer of nuclear charges, rules out the possibility of a spontaneous explosion. However, he feels it is essential to find out the condition of the explosive device, since there is no guarantee that it won't detonate during the construction of the additional access shaft.

KYRGYZSTAN

Commercial SS-18 Missile December Launch Confirmed

LD0511224893 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 0000 gmt 5 Nov 93

[Text] The government of Kazakhstan has confirmed that the [name indistinct] private corporation is organizing a major commercial launching of an SS-18 ballistic missile from Baykonur space site this December. According to the Almaty newspaper OGNI ALATAU, the project is being implemented on instructions of the national air-space agency [word indistinct] in collaboration with a number of Ukrainian and Russian companies. It is planned to use missile-carriers located on the territory of Kazakhstan and due for annihilation in accordance with the SALT-I Treaty.

UKRAINE

Government Reaffirms Ownership Over Nuclear Weapons

LD0311112293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0946 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev [no dateline, as received]—On 2 November at a briefing of the Ministry of Foreign affairs, Oleksandr Potyekhin, head of the USA and Canada department of the Foreign Ministry's second territorial directorate told journalists that Ukraine has not changed its plans regarding the renunciation of nuclear weapons, but that a concrete resolution of the problem is being hampered by Russia, which claims exclusive rights with regard to maintaining peace in the former USSR. "Ukraine has grounds to be concerned about its security," noted Oleksandr Potyekhin. "This is why the issue of compensation for weapons that have been withdrawn is of primary importance to us and appropriate security guarantees from other states is of secondary importance." In the opinion of Volodymyr Balashov, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry's directorate for control, armament, and disarmament, because Russia refuses to extend the meaning of the term "nuclear warhead" to tactical nuclear weapons that have already been withdrawn to Russia, Ukraine will continue to insist on its right of ownership and will fulfil the agreement with regard to nuclear weapons signed in Massandra, only on the condition that it receives compensation for tactical weapons. According to information from Volodymyr Balashov, not a single legal document that would regulate

relations between Ukraine and Russia on issues of tactical weapons has yet been elaborated.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Defends Request for Compensation

LD031111093 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, 2 Nov—At the regular briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ron Popeski, chief of the Reuter correspondents center in Ukraine, disseminated the information that Mr. Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council, had demanded \$5 billion compensation for 170 Ukrainian strategic missiles during his meeting with Warren Christopher. Borys Hudyma, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs employee, said to this that, first, Plyushch had named this figure in relation to the value of the uranium, and second, that this is subject to finalization.

Data on Nuclear Arms Deployed on Republic's Territory

WS0411145793 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian 3 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by V. Tymoshenko, assistant professor of the military department at the Lvov Polytechnic Institute under the rubric "POST- POSTUP File"]

[Text] Some 130 intercontinental ballistic SS-19 missiles [ICBM] are deployed in Ukraine. Each missile can carry six warheads with total explosive potential of 550 kilotonnes, which is 27.5 times larger than that of the Little Boy atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The SS-19 was designed by Chelomey's designer bureau located in Arkhangelsk Oblast Plesetsk. The SS-19 is a two-stage liquid-propellant fourth-generation ICBM. Its maximum range is 10,000 kilometers and the minimum range is assessed at 850 kilometers which permits hitting targets in Europe and Asia. The SS-19 are deployed in Mykolayiv Oblast Pervomaysk, Vinnytsya, and Khmelnytskyy Oblasts. The Army was equipped with these missiles in 1984. A division armed with SS-19 is a unit consisting of 10 to 12 regiments, including the units servicing warheads and maintaining missile systems. Highly proficient officers for these units are trained at Dzerzhynskiy Military Academy in Moscow, Mozhayskiy Military Institute in St. Petersburg, and a number of military colleges.

Twenty four railroad-based mobile SS-24 ICBM's are also located in Ukraine. These missiles are one of the latest Soviet designs and were deployed in 1987. The SS-24 is a fifth-generation missile equipped with individual homing devices, carrying 10 warheads with a total explosive potential of 100 to 550 kilotonnes. The missile was designed by Nadiradze's bureau and is produced in Biysk, while its propelling units—in Pavlodar. This is a solid-propellant ICBM with maximum range of 10,000 kilometers and a maximum deviation from the target of 0.1 miles. These missiles are deployed on railroad platforms that constantly circle within the range of 200-250 kilometers.

Thus, Ukraine is in possession of 176 ICBM's with 1240 warheads. The aggregate potential of nuclear arms deployed in Ukraine amounts to 36,250 bombs dropped on Hiroshima.

Aside from this, heavy bombers equipped with nuclear weapons are also stationed in Ukraine. These are the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-26 Backfire bombers designed by Tupolev's bureau and produced in Kazan. They are equipped with approximately 400 pieces of nuclear munition. The Tu-160 is a four-engined variable geometry long range supersonic bomber.

The other type is the well-known Tu-22M Backfire—the twin-engined variable geometry medium bomber capable of carrying two pieces of nuclear munition.

Defense Ministry Exec Denies Nuclear Weapons Damaged

LD2910141393 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1210 GMT
29 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev, 29 Oct—"The state of nuclear weapons in Ukraine corresponds to the norms. In several mass media sources, in particular the IZVESTIYA paper, the state of protection of our nuclear weapons has not accurately been portrayed."

Colonel Volodymyr Tertychnyy, deputy head of the directorate for safeguarding nuclear weapons of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, told a UNIAR correspondent that "nuclear weapons which have been taken to Russia are not damaged."

Tarasyuk States Terms for Disarmament of Nuclear Warheads

LD0311174293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1649 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yefim Shvartsman]

[Text] Kiev, 3 Nov—Not one deactivated SS-20 missile warhead has been, or will be taken from Ukraine to Russia until Ukraine, Russia and America settle the question of just compensation for tactical nuclear weapons.

This approach to the agreement, signed at the beginning of September on the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory to Russia under the START I Treaty, was outlined by Boris Tarasyuk, chairman of Ukraine's National Committee for Disarmament, in an interview to the parliamentary paper VOICE OF UKRAINE [GOLOS UKRAINYY]. The committee chairman said that the same goes for all other types of missiles and that Ukraine's Supreme Soviet should decide on this.

Draft Treaty Seeks Liquidation of 36 Percent of Warheads

LD2910172593 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1430 GMT
29 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev [no date as received]—Ukraine's Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy told journalists today that the draft START-1 treaty "envisions the liquidation of 42 percent of launch vehicles and 36 percent of warheads in Ukraine." The defense minister refused to mention the terms of liquidation or report any other details until the Supreme Council adopts a relevant decision.

No More Warheads To Be Withdrawn Until Compensation Settled

LD0211124393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1100 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] None of the nuclear warheads from the deactivated SS-19 rockets have been withdrawn and will not be withdrawn until the issue of fair compensation for tactical weapons removed last year is resolved between Ukraine and Russia or between Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S.. This was stated today in an interview for the newspaper HOLOS UKRAINY by Borys Tarasyuk, chairman of the National Committee for Questions of Disarmament and obviously, he stressed, not until the Supreme Council adopts the appropriate decisions. In general this relates to any class of rockets.

Dismantling Nuclear Weapons at Manufacture Site Urged

LD0311094893 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 0800 GMT
3 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, 2 Nov—The regular briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was devoted to topical issues of Ukraine's foreign policy. Volodymyr Byelashov, deputy head of the directorate of control over armaments and disarmament, stated that Ukraine is ready to pay for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons [yaderni boyezaryady] and the processing of the removed uranium and plutonium at those enterprises, where they were produced, on condition that all of the end nuclear material (including that removed from the warheads of tactical missiles) will be returned in the form of fuel for atomic electric power stations or compensation for [its] sale to third countries. Mr. Byelashov noted that only a fair resolution of this problem will make it possible to implement the agreements signed in Massandra, in as far as the Russian side is refusing to extend the term "nuclear weapon" [yadernyy boyezaryad] to tactical nuclear weapons, withdrawn to Russia. Mr. Byelashov also emphasized that Ukraine is striving, while remaining within the limits established by the treaty of general limits [Dohovir zahalnykh limitiv], to independently determine the distribution of the armed forces on its territory.

Borys Hudyma, head of the directorate of international organizations, summing up the general debate at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly, reported that its main problems had been issues of settling interethnic conflicts following the end of the "cold war" and searching for ways of increasing the efficiency of "preventive diplomacy," in particular the place and role of the UN in conducting peacekeeping operations.

Recent Chernobyl Theft, Security at Nuclear Plants Viewed

WS101110193 Kiev KIEVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian
30 Oct 93 p 6

[Article by Yuriy Khlystun: "The Vanishing of Nuclear Fuel"]

[Text] In an official declaration issued on 26 October, leaders of the State Committee for Use of Atomic Energy and the Chernobyl station director, N. Sorokin, reassured

the populace that only 260 grams of uranium-235 had disappeared from the Chernobyl station. It is a well-known fact that the equipped tvl [heat emitting element] contains only 1.8 percent of this element, which is a little less than 3.5 kg of nuclear fuel in each missing component.

Nevertheless, one of the main leads being investigated is theft followed by subsequent resale. All the more probable since such incidents have been reported in the past. In March of last year, the same thing happened at the Ignalinsk nuclear power plant in Lithuania. The theft was discovered during an annual inventory. Although R. Vasnis, chairman of the Lithuanian Committee for Atomic Energy Security, doubts that it was really a theft, the station's employees are convinced that the 7-meter-high container weighing 280 kg was stolen by a well-informed criminal group.

It was quite recently that disintegrative materials from the CIS appeared on the Western black markets, and they managed to raise serious concern among law-enforcement agencies in those countries. Last year in Germany, more than 100 attempts to sell radioactive substances were thwarted. German Environment Minister Klaus Toepfer described the situation as "extremely serious." A year ago, he was in Frankfurt and observed an operation to seize a load of cesium at the railroad station. Sometimes, it comes to comic situations such as one that happened in Ahlen, Germany. A local police department was informed that a Polish citizen attempted to sell 10 kg of uranium-235 for \$600,000. When they arrived at the site, the policemen were surprised to learn that the entrepreneur also wanted to sell CIS warheads.

The dangerous spread of disintegrative materials throughout the world forced the International Atomic Energy Agency to set up a special department to monitor illegal operations in the nuclear sphere. However, the agency's opponents—the international organization "Anti-Atom International"—argue that its recommendations on storing radioactive substances are "too complicated and vague, even for experts."

Besides the uranium, which sells for \$1,000 per 1 kg, the perpetrators could have been attracted by a nice-looking zirconium pipe flashing all rainbow colors. Incidentally, 1 gram of zirconium sells for \$13.3.

As for preventing thefts at nuclear plants, Vadym Yusyn, physical protection specialist from the State Committee for Nuclear and Radioactive Security, said it is not properly organized in Ukraine—even though it is the bedrock for security of any country. In the developed countries, you cannot even get near a main nuclear reactor building. You would be safe touring their stations even with a baby, but security will "scan" everyone, even the president. In Germany, when an unidentified object is close enough, a bullet-proof door will automatically shut. Flying objects would be shot down. In our country, on 16 October, a plane—I think it was Yak-40—circled the station three times uninhabited. And it has not been until recently that we managed to find out that it belonged to a commercial bank. It was not spotted by anti-aircraft defense forces as it flew over at a low altitude. The pilot said that he was lost. Now, the authorities are having a hard time trying to figure out exactly what laws he violated. Even though Ukraine

ratified the International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Substances on 5 May, no regulatory documents have been assembled until now. To be honest, we work like amateurs. The country has not yet developed a proper system of physical protection from nuclear accidents. Our system is safe against assaults from outside, but not from within. It is assumed that all the staff are checked, and there can be no dumb or deranged people in the station. In other countries, employees are put through special tests. As for the fences, they build them 2 meters into the ground. I am the only specialist working in the protection sphere, compared to 22 experts in Germany. The developed countries are, simply put, afraid of us. From March 1992 to March 1993, German authorities reported 20 cases of illegal trade in radioactive substances, presumably coming from the CIS countries. While Russia has already started to improve the physical protection systems at its nuclear plants, Ukraine has undertaken no measures in this regard. It is still widely assumed that there are no terrorists in our country.

Will the recent incident prompt any changes? The question remains open.

Political Link, Threat From Missing Chernobyl Fuel Denied

WS0311154893 Kiev KYYIVSKYY VISNYK in Ukrainian
28 Oct 93 p 1

[Interview with Mykola Sorokin, director of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, by Viktor Demenyev; place and date not given: "From the Chernobyl Station, 129.6 Grams of Uranium-235 Disappeared. Who Stole it and Why, Under Investigation"—first paragraph is KYYIVSKYY VISNYK introduction]

[Text] The mass media have reported that two heat-emitting elements, tvls, which were part of one of the heat-emitting "assembly," TVZ, [sborka], have disappeared from the Chernobyl nuclear power station. What happened? In the central control room of the No. 3 nuclear unit, our correspondent interviewed Mykola Sorokin, general director of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, about this disappearance.

Demenyev: When and how was the theft discovered?

Sorokin: It was noticed during procedural work in the fuel-preparation and storage room where the same "assemblies" are located. They consist of two parts—a top and bottom, both 3.5 meters long. So two tvls were neatly cut out. (M. Sorokin is pointing to zirconium pipes encircling the carrying rod [nesuchyy sterzhen] containing nuclear fuel, uranium-235. The pipes look very nice, flashing all colors of the rainbow.) I must say that the dissembled TVZ was made in 1982 and was at the station even before the meltdown. The cassette (the short name for the TVZ used by atomic experts) was not used in the reactor because of a design flaw—clearance between the top and bottom parts of the TVZ are too narrow.

Demenyev: Do you think that the tvls present any radioactive or nuclear threat, whether in the station or outside it?

Sorokin: They present no nuclear threat because two tvls contain very little uranium-235; only 129.6 grams. The

experience of activating reactors shows that at least 20 cassettes must be loaded into a reactor to reach the critical mass. Since each cassette contains 36 tvels, you would need 720 tvels to initiate a chain reaction in—let me repeat this—specially created conditions. As for radiation, we are now standing beside several TVZs. The radiation level here is the same as in the central room of the unit. Danger from radiation is only posed by a cassette irradiated in the reactor. Let me emphasize that again—the stolen cassette was never loaded there.

A special commission was set up at the station investigating the accident in conjunction with the Ukrainian Security Service and other law-enforcement agencies. I cannot tell you anything else about the investigation because, until its completion, it is considered a state secret. After it is over, we will immediately make the findings public.

Demyenev: This incident occurred just before the Ukrainian Supreme Council decided to continue operation of the Chernobyl station. Do you not think that this was a provocation of those who actively oppose that decision?

Sorokin: I have no grounds to think so. I believe it has nothing to do with supporters or opponents of the station's continued operation.

Demyenev: The fuel-preparation and storage room is strictly controlled and encircled with several security cordons. This prompts a suggestion that someone who had permanent access to this room is involved in the theft.

Sorokin: I would not like to cast a shadow on all the station's personnel, especially those who work with the fuel. Let us not jump the gun. The investigation will show who is responsible for the theft, and hopefully, no such accident will ever happen again at the station.

FRANCE

'Gulf Between President, Premier on Nuclear Policy

*BR2910193993 Paris LIBERATION in French
29 Oct 93 p 8*

[Article by Dominique Garraud: "Nuclear Weapons: The Strategic Quarrel Behind the Tests—The debate on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests is Just the Visible Tip of a Confrontation on the Future of the Strike Force. While the Right and the Military Want To Develop Mini-Bombs Against a Third World Threat, the Elysee Remains Committed to a Weak Versus the Strong Deterrent"]

[Text] It is a promise. The question of the nuclear deterrent's future will not be the subject of heated argument between the government led by Edouard Balladur and President Francois Mitterrand. Not for the moment that is. Because leaving aside the question of whether or not it is appropriate for France to renew nuclear testing, there is clearly a gulf between the position of the governing majority and the head of state on this French policy.

The progress report on the White Paper on defense, which has just been submitted to Edouard Balladur by Marceau Long, remains very prudent on the matter of the nuclear deterrent. The word is that it sets out three scenarios for the year 2000, with a single constant feature which is both very costly and of dubious effectiveness: The acquisition of an antimissile capacity within the framework of European cooperation.

The first scenario is to maintain the strike force at its present level (approximately 470 nuclear warheads). The force would be modernized, with a likely abandonment of the Albion plateau land component. The sea component would remain with nuclear submarine rocket launchers equipped with M45 and later M5 missiles, plus an airborne component with the possible acquisition of a missile which would at least double the range of the present ground-to-air medium-range missile (range 100 to 300 km).

Second scenario: A significant reduction in the nuclear arsenal (perhaps ultimately retaining no more than the submarine component), coupled with an increase in so-called "intelligent" conventional weapons in order to guarantee, alongside the nuclear deterrent, a conventional deterrent on which the Americans are working. Third scenario: To adapt the deterrent to the new geostrategic context. This means retaining the present "anticipated" capacity while backing it up with more modern weapons able to deter new potential aggressors which may join the nuclear club.

This deliberately vague third option is the one recommended to the government. It underlies a major shift in the nature of the French deterrent. In addition to the so-called "weak versus the strong" deterrent (against the thousands of nuclear warheads in the former USSR), there would also be a "strong versus the weak" or "strong versus the madman" deterrent. In addition to powerful warheads (300 kilotons or more) designed to destroy complete cities, weaker warheads would also be developed intended to destroy strategic centers without causing major losses among the civilian population.

The debate on this reorientation began at the time of the Gulf War, when Francois Mitterrand formally ruled out any use of nuclear weapons against Saddam Husayn, who was threatening to load chemical or bacteriological warheads onto Scud missiles. Jacques Chirac and also Edouard Balladur then spoke out to denounce the president of the Republic for breaking with the traditional element of "unpredictability" surrounding any use of nuclear weapons. The idea of a deterrent of the "strong versus the weak" was then taken up in the following months by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee chaired by Jean Lecanuet. But it is only recently that it was raised again as an argument for preparing the White Paper, whose final version the government is due to publish in the spring.

General Vincent Lanata, Air Force chief of staff, argued in September's issue of the NATIONAL DEFENSE magazine that, in his opinion, the necessary move toward "a capacity to strike vital centers argues in favor of high-precision systems with a modular (nuclear) warhead," or of variable energy. In the same publication, Colonel Henri de Roqueseuil, deputy chief of operations of the Strategic Air Force, stated that this logic of the deterrent of "the strong versus the weak in the face of a nuclear, biological, or chemical threat could lead the head of state to prove his determination by an ultimate warning strike" using an "airborne missile of several kilotons." "This would, however, mean abandoning the concept of the nondeployment of weapons."

These two military men have been alone in publicly expressing their views. But interviews we have conducted with high-ranking members of the military show that this is the dominant attitude in the military-industrial sector and among members of the governing majority. The argument in essence says that the future will bring real and repeated threats from, as General Lanata put it, "potential aggressors with limited and primitive arsenals."

The scenario most frequently evoked is that of a dictator deciding to attack using "refuse missiles" loaded with nuclear waste in order to provoke panic, if not serious destruction, in major cities. Such an enemy would have scant regard for any suffering inflicted on his own people, fearing only for his own survival. To dissuade or strike back against such a dictator, it would be necessary to threaten a "decapitating strike" either by destroying the individual himself or his command centers and/or vital economic centers.

This is where the limited nuclear warheads have a role to play. A single missile charged with an "antibunker penetration" system and 0.5 kiloton nuclear warhead no bigger than a champagne bucket would be able to provide a destructive capacity equivalent to 500 conventional bombs of 1 ton each. The missile precision, at present 10 meters for the most accurate (and further progress remains possible), would avoid "collateral damage" which is inevitably involved in carpet bombing. To support their argument, advocates of these new "guided bombs" not only point to the inevitability of nuclear proliferation but also to the fact that the United States has long possessed the know-how to miniaturize nuclear weapons, in the form of "tiny," "mini," and "micro-nukes." It would not, therefore, be wise to allow the Americans alone, and perhaps the

Russians, to modernize their arsenals while retaining only megaton warheads designed to wipe out whole cities. It is also true that by the late fifties, the Americans had successfully carried out nuclear tests with warheads of between 36 and 100 tons, and there is no reason not to suppose that their secret plans, or "black programs," still occupy research teams seeking to make further progress in developing miniature and precision nuclear weapons. These American advances also concern nuclear testing, suggest the same experts, who claim that the United States could have carried out in the past—and could still today—nuclear tests with small warheads without being detected. To stop French tests and not to modernize the present capability would therefore ultimately mean leaving the Americans, Russians, and other possible future nuclear powers in sole possession of a credible strike force capacity.

The problem is that the current president is diametrically opposed to this line of thought. Supported by some members of the military, principally in the Army, Francois Mitterrand is urging a ban on nuclear testing and also, ultimately, a reduction of an excessive global nuclear arsenal to the lowest possible level. His statements on the subject have remained constant; although obliged to accept tactical short-range nuclear weapons, it was to limit their role to that of the "ultimate warning."

"The nuclear deterrent is not supposed to provide a response to all threats, but to those which concern our

country's vital interests. I do not see the president approving a change of direction which would make nuclear weapons into weapons of retaliation and coercion. It is illusory to think that we can retain one major deterrent alongside another aimed at the south" states a close associate. Alain Joxe, director of the Research Center for Peace and Strategic Studies, also sees in this "extravagant option" the desire to retain the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) research teams and guarantee the powerful industrial interests of the nuclear lobby.

While deputies such as Pierre Lellouche of the RPR, diplomatic adviser to Jacques Chirac, advocate a "necessary evolution" in French policy, none of the principal spokesmen in the governing majority nor Defense Minister Francois Leotard have yet to recommend a specific choice. This consensus by default, which can at present be attributed to continuing debate on the subject, threatens to endure and be included in the final version of the White Paper, the deterrent aspects of which Francois Mitterrand should have more than the right to examine. The real choices would then be postponed until after the presidential elections. Unless, in the middle of an election campaign, one year from now, the governing majority decides to activate what has already become a time bomb. The likelihood of this is in fact very slim as a survey conducted by the Defense Ministry shows that 65 percent of the French would be opposed to renewed nuclear tests.

ROK, U.S. To Meet on Export of Strategic Materials

SK3110110493 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 1010 GMT 31 Oct 93

[Text] Our country and the United States will hold a working-level meeting of the committee for control of exports to the communist sphere in Seoul on 1 November. They will intensively discuss the issue of controlling import and export of strategic materials, including nuclear-related materials.

At the talks our side, pointing out the fact that our country introduced early this month a system of controlling imports and exports of strategic materials, will actively request that the U.S. side transfer ultramodern technology and expand import and export of high-standard technological items.

The U.S. side, however, will likely insist on first examining if the control of strategic materials, when they were exported to the communist bloc nations, was properly implemented after our country adopted this system before they transfer technology.

ROK, U.S. Agree To Put Off Decision on 1994 Team Spirit

Will Watch for DPRK Policy Change

SK0411011893 Seoul YONHAP in English 0105 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 4 (YONHAP)—South Korea and the United States agreed Thursday [4 November] not to make any decision for the present on whether to hold the joint military exercise "Team Spirit" next year.

The two countries decided that they will make the decision after watching signs of change in North Korea's nuclear policy.

The agreement came between Defense Minister Kwon Yong-hae and U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at a tête-a-tête on Thursday morning. Aspin is here for the 25th annual security consultative meeting (SCM).

Kwon and Aspin shared the opinion that Team Spirit is inevitable as long as the South Korea-U.S. defense system exists, officials said.

But the two countries will study the possibility of suspending the exercise if North Korea shows a drastic change in its policy and returns to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), accepts International Atomic Energy Agency and inter-Korean inspections of its nuclear facilities and implements the inter-Korean declaration for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Results of Defense Ministers' Meeting

SK0411045093 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 0300 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] The ROK and the United States agreed to withhold the decision to shelve the suspension of the 1994 Team Spirit exercise until after further observation of North Korea's attitude.

Reporter Kim Hui-chol reports from the Ministry of Defense on talks between the ROK defense minister and the U.S. defense secretary held this morning and the plenary meeting of the ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting [SCM] to be held this afternoon:

[Begin Kim recording] Recognizing that North Korea's nuclear development should be deterred by all means, the ROK defense minister and the U.S. defense secretary agreed not to make the decision at this meeting on whether or not they will suspend the 1994 Team Spirit exercise.

The two defense ministers agreed to review if the two countries will suspend the 1994 Team Spirit exercise if North Korea shows an epochal change in its attitude toward denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, including acceptance of a special inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency and North-South mutual inspection.

The two defense ministers also reconfirmed their previous position of withholding the second phase of reduction of U.S. forces in the ROK until North Korea's nuclear issue is completely resolved.

The two defense ministers finally approved the timing for transferring the right of peacetime operational control over Korean forces, which was agreed to at the Military Committee meeting on 3 November.

At the same time, it was learned that the defense ministers discussed in-depth the way to transfer the right of wartime operational control of the 7th Fleet under the U.S. Pacific Command to the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command according to the new U.S. defense policy called "simultaneous victory in two regions in dispute."

At the plenary meeting of the ROK-U.S. SCM to be held this afternoon, it appears the two countries will reconfirm their existing security relations and will specifically work out mid- and long-range methods for military cooperation between the countries.

It was learned that at today's meeting, the two countries will reach an agreement on the issue of increasing the share of the defense cost of the U.S. forces in the ROK to \$235 million, on which they have seriously differed from each other in the past. This amount reflects an increase of \$40 million over this year.

After the meeting ends, the two countries will announce the result of the meeting through a joint statement and a joint news conference by the two defense ministers. [end recording]

ROK Papers Carry Editorials on U.S.-DPRK Contacts

SK3010142493

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of editorials from ROK vernacular newspapers on recent U.S.-North Korean contacts and discussion of a package deal to resolve the nuclear issue.

The moderate Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean on 30 October publishes on page 3 a 600-word editorial noting that a package deal is worth trying, but it would be difficult

to expect North Korea to comply with international judgment as a result of such a deal. The editorial reports that North Korea refused to accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which means North Korea would act on its own in spite of opinions by the international community.

The editorial notes the impasse of the package deal is the imbalance of requirements by the two parties. The United States has offered substantial concessions regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations and economic cooperation, while North Korea has requested the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise, suspension of the international coordination system, and even support to replace its nuclear reactors with a light-water system. The editorial contends it is impossible to predict the additional conditions the North would add to the package deal regarding the U.S. Army in Korea, the peace accord, and U.S. treatment of North Korea.

The editorial suggests that if North Korea continues to request more concessions in the package deal, we should raise the issues of human rights and missiles and seek ways to make North Korea comply with its responsibilities as a member of the international community.

The moderate Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean on 30 October publishes on page 3 a 700-word editorial on the government's policy on the North Korean nuclear issue.

Commenting on the report that the ROK Government sent a positive sign to the United States on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the North and the United States, the editorial denounces that the government's diplomacy lacks independence.

The editorial notes that North Korea has been persistent in its demands and has made the most out of its nuclear card and President Clinton's series of mistakes in disputed areas, while the ROK seems to have been excluded from the negotiations between Washington and North Korea.

The editorial urges more prudent and considerate diplomacy and urges the government not to repeat imprudent policies, such as the hasty announcement of denuclearization.

The independent Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean on 30 October publishes on page 3 a 800-word editorial entitled "The Government Must Be More Active in Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue." Referring to the recent North Korean-U.S. behind-the-scene contacts, the editorial contends that to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, the United States will likely establish diplomatic relations with North Korea and support its replacement of nuclear reactors with light-water reactors.

The editorial stresses that to resolve the issue by implementation of a package deal in which North Korea gives up its development of nuclear weapons and guarantees its transparency, North Korea should guarantee a level of transparency of its nuclear development that would be acceptable to the international community.

The editorial reports the government feels North Korea will possess enough plutonium to produce from one to three nuclear weapons, and that it will manufacture

nuclear weapons by 1995, at the latest. The editorial concludes by urging the government to strengthen its capacity to cope with North Korea's nuclear weapons and not to be dependent on other countries to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

PRC Envoy Expresses Support for DPRK-U.S. Talks

SK0411071893 Beijing China Radio International
in Korean 1100 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] On 1 November, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution urging many countries to strengthen international cooperation, to use nuclear energy for a peaceful purpose, and to guarantee the effective execution of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. The resolution also urges the DPRK to fully observe and guarantee the agreement by cooperating with the IAEA immediately.

In a discussion, Pak Kil-yon, DPRK ambassador to the United Nations, was resolutely opposed to the resolution adopted at the United Nations and said that this resolution constitutes a grave infringement on DPRK sovereignty and puts unreasonable political pressure on the DPRK.

In a discussion, PRC Representative (Wu Cheng-jiang) said that the PRC abstained from the vote. The PRC representative made the PRC position clear once again that the PRC supports the principled position of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. He stressed that the four parties should seek an impartial, reasonable, and overall solution through negotiations and bargaining on the basis of equality and mutual respect because the DPRK nuclear issue is an issue among the four parties, the DPRK, the United States, the ROK, and the IAEA.

Saying that the PRC welcomes the holding of DPRK-U.S. talks, (Wu Cheng-jiang) added that the talks would help resolve the issue.

DPRK Envoy Criticizes UNGA Nuclear Resolution

OW0211023493 Tokyo KYODO in English
0205 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] New York, Nov. 1 KYODO—The United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] adopted a resolution Monday [1 November] urging North Korea by a vote of 140-1 to comply with demands from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for a full inspection of its suspected nuclear facilities.

The nine-point resolution was adopted following a report to the Assembly by IAEA Director General Hans Blix on the Vienna-based agency's efforts to negotiate with Pyongyang over the inspection.

North Korean U.N. Ambassador Pak Kil-yon said in a special statement that the resolution was inappropriate and an impediment to efforts by North Korea to resolve the issue through negotiations.

Following two rounds of talks with the U.S. this summer, Pyongyang has maintained that the issue can only be resolved through bilateral negotiations with Washington.

The U.S. has argued that suspicions about North Korea secretly attempting to create a nuclear arsenal can only be allayed through IAEA and inter-Korean inspections.

On Monday, North Korea was the only nation to vote against the resolution. Nine nations abstained, including China, Cuba and Vietnam.

The resolution, jointly submitted by 51 nations including Japan and South Korea, expresses "grave concern" that North Korea has "failed to discharge its safe-guard obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance."

It calls for North Korea's immediate cooperation with the IAEA for full implementation of the agreement.

North Korea has refused to permit the inspection of two sites in Yongbyon, some 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang, suspected of being part of a secret nuclear weapons program.

Stymied by IAEA demands for inspection, Pyongyang announced in March that it was withdrawing from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It later "suspended" the decision following the first round of talks with the U.S.

Negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. in recent weeks have led to speculation that Washington may grant Pyongyang diplomatic recognition in exchange for a complete inspection of the facilities by the IAEA.

DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement on UN Resolution

SK0411115993 Pyongyang Korean Central Television Network in Korean 1116 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] In connection with the fact that a resolution on the annual activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], which contains, as well, references to the nuclear inspections of our country, was adopted at the 48th UN General Assembly session on 1 November, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman released a press statement [tamhwa] condemning this today.

Press statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman

A resolution on the IAEA's annual activities was adopted at the 48th UN General Assembly session on 1 November. This resolution contains, as well, references to the nuclear inspections of our country.

The references to our issue were unreasonably contained in a comprehensive [pugwalchok] resolution that sums up the IAEA's annual activities. We cannot but consider this to be the byproduct of the clumsy [yuchihan] anti-Republic maneuvers by some elements who played a leading role in fabricating this resolution.

The issue of including our issue in the draft resolution to be presented to the UN General Assembly was discussed at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors. However, no agreement was reached due to differences in views.

This was a just strike against some members of the IAEA Secretariat whose baseness has been brought into broad daylight by the forgery case of the UN Secretary General's letter, which is unparalleled in the annals of history.

Thereupon, some Western countries, being in an awkward situation, made Australia stand as the chairman country of

the board of governors and draw up a draft of the resolution which finds fault with us, and then submitted the resolution before the UN General Assembly.

Our issue was being included in the recent resolution as the result of the base machinations of the impure forces who attempted to justify their unreasonable act, enforcing unjust inspections on us under the cloak of the so-called opinion of the international community.

Such resolution, which is nothing but a bastard of political conspiracy, can never be the opinion of the international community. We can in no way accept this [jurinun iron-gosul chuhodo injonghaji anul kossida].

Substantial discussions have recently been going on between the DPRK and the United States to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, and prospects are seen for its resolution. At such a time, some Western countries and their followers played the game of adopting a resolution. This is no coincidence. This shows that they are truly trying to fulfill their unchanging goal of doing harm on our Republic, even though they say publicly that they want the resolution of the nuclear issue. In particular, right after the resolution was adopted, a person in military authority in South Korea referred to a military countermeasure [kunsayok taeung] against us. This more clearly discloses the essence of their insidious goal.

If they, by fabricating such a valueless resolution, try to make ill use of it in stifling [apsal] and doing harm on our Republic, we will, as a matter of course, resolutely take a countermeasure [tanbohui taechohae nagal kossida] against it.

It is very clear that insidious forces' pressure and blackmailing were all along behind the adoption of the resolution.

They are making it their undertaking to carry matters very high-handedly [kuktoui chonhoengul ilsango itchiman] even in the United Nations. This is a futile effort.

In a vote on the resolution's clauses relating to our issue, no fewer than 80 countries opposed them, abstained, or absented themselves, thus running counter to the intention of those countries which fabricated the resolution and their followers. This more clearly proves the justness of our principled position.

No pressure will work on us. We will continuously maintain the principled position that the nuclear issue must be resolved only through dialogue and negotiations.

DPRK Delegation's Statement Criticizes 1 Nov UN Resolution

SK0411113593 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1122 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Statement of DPRK Delegation"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, November 4 (KCNA)—The DPRK delegation made public a statement on the adoption of an unreasonable "resolution" concerning the nuclear problem at the UN General Assembly session on November 1.

It is an infringement upon the sovereignty of the DPRK and a part of the sinister political offensive to put pressure

upon us to discuss the "question of nuclear inspection" of the DPRK and adopt a resolution, says the statement, and continues:

Putting pressure on us at a time when the talks for a solution of the nuclear problem are going on between the DPRK and the United States cannot be construed otherwise than a deliberate act to foil the efforts for negotiation.

The adoption of the "resolution" was also aimed at covering up the application of double-standard by some officials of the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency and their unjustifiable acts under the name of the United Nations.

As some Western countries pressed unreasonable demand to us by abusing the name of the United Nations, it left another stain on its name in the Korean question.

The United Nations must pay due attention to the fact that it, instead of liquidating the products of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula, has infringed upon the sovereignty of one of its member nations and laid grave obstacles to the efforts for negotiation against the demand of the times.

The course of the adoption of the "resolution" showed that the Western countries' call for "termination of the Cold War" and "era of dialogue and negotiation" was nothing but an empty talk.

And it has become clear that for their interests, they even politicize scientific and technical institutions, violate the basic principle of the UN charter on respect for sovereignty and apply a double standard ignoring international law and usage.

Facts show more clearly that the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula can be solved only through the DPRK-U.S. talks.

The United States acceded to talks with the DPRK because it admitted the partiality and limitation of the IAEA and recognised that the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula could be solved only through talks between the DPRK and itself, the direct parties concerned.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hopes that the members of the international community will refrain from acts obstructive to the progress of the DPRK-U.S. talks as required by the times.

We demand that, if the Western countries truly want the solution of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula through negotiation, they should admit that the adoption of the "resolution" this time is an act obstructive to the efforts for negotiation and refrain from violating the UN.

The South Korean authorities, in particular, must apologize for their dastardly act of becoming a co-sponsor of the "resolution" against fellow countrymen, while having working-level contacts for the exchange of special envoys, and must refrain from acts of hindering the progress of the DPRK-U.S. talks and respond at an early date to our proposal for the exchange of special envoys in the spirit of national independence, if they are interested in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the implementation of the North-South agreement.

The DPRK delegation makes it clear once again that it resolutely opposes the "resolution" adopted at the 48th UN General Assembly with regard to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula.

President Kim Meets With German Defense Minister Ruehe

SK0111055993 Seoul YONHAP in English
0537 GMT 1 Nov 93

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 1 (YONHAP)—President Kim Yong-sam and German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe exchanged views on issues of mutual interest, including North Korea's nuclear development, on Monday morning at Chongwadae [presidential offices].

Kim said that he appreciated the German Government's efforts in seeking a solution to North Korea's nuclear problem.

"I expect Germany to play an active role in backing up international cooperation to solve the North Korean nuclear issue," Senior Presidential Press Secretary Yi Kyong-chae quoted Kim as telling Ruehe.

also expressed the hope that the two countries will further promote cooperation in defense industry.

Ruehe, meanwhile, reportedly said that his country was suffering from such problems as financial burden and psychological heterogeneity among youths between east and west after the reunification of east and west Germany.

Defense Minister Kwon Yong-hae also met with Ruehe and they discussed ways to improve relations in defense between the two countries.

Ruehe is to give a speech on German security policy at the National Defense Graduate School later in the day. He leaves for Tokyo on Tuesday.

Japan Favors Dialogue Over Sanctions Against DPRK

SK3110091893 Seoul YONHAP in English
0909 GMT 31 Oct 93

[Text] Tokyo, Oct. 31 (YONHAP)—Japan is holding off any stringent measures such as sanctions and opting for dialogue in dealing with Pyongyang's nuclear problem, TOKYO SHIMBUN reported Sunday.

The turnaround is based on China's and Russia's cautious stance toward enforcing sanctions against North Korea, the paper reported quoting Foreign Ministry sources.

Japan, too, believes it is better to continue the dialogue to change North Korea's nuclear policy than to isolate North Korea and push it further into nuclear development, the paper said.

Another reason for the turnaround is Japan's judgment that it will take 1 to 5 years for North Korea to be able to develop and actually use nuclear weapons, it said.

South Korea agrees with Japan's position and so does the United States, according to the quoted Ministry sources.

The ongoing North Korea-U.S. contact in New York, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Hans Blix's report to the United Nations Nov. 1 are critical factors in North Korea's nuclear situation, TOKYO SHIMBUN said.

But Blix's report emphasizes factual explanations rather than political implications of the matter, it said, and chances of the report leading to U.N. sanctions against North Korea is slim.

U.N. Resolution on DPRK Nuclear Issue Published

Nine Points

*SK0311033793 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
3 Nov 93 p 4*

[“UN IAEA Resolution”]

[Text]

1. Takes note of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
2. Affirms its confidence in the role of the Agency in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
3. Welcomes the re-appointment of Dr. Hans Blix as Director General of the Agency;
4. Urges all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency, pursuant to its statute; in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to life, health and the environment; in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system of the Agency;
5. Welcomes the decisions taken by the Agency to strengthen its safeguards system;
6. Welcomes also the decisions taken by the Agency to strengthen its technical assistance and co-operation activities;
7. Commends the director general and the secretariat of the Agency for their impartial efforts to implement the safeguards agreement still in force between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement;
8. Also commends the director general of the Agency and his staff for their strenuous efforts in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) of 4 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991 and 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, and endorses his efforts to put in place the necessary measures for the implementation of the plan for future ongoing monitoring, in accordance with Security Council resolution 715 (1991);
9. Requests the secretary-general of the Agency the records of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly relating to the activities of the Agency.

Further Details

*SK3010113093 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
1010 GMT 30 Oct 93*

[Text] The UN General Assembly will open its main session on 1 November and will adopt a resolution urging North Korea to accept nuclear inspections. We have a report from Kang Song-chu.

[Begin Kang recording] Forty six countries, including Australia, the ROK, the United States, England, and Japan, which are member countries of the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], presented a joint resolution before the UN General Assembly on 27 October concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. This resolution, which has been referred to the 48th UN General Assembly as item No. 14 on its agenda, urges North Korea to cooperate immediately with the IAEA by fully implementing the Nuclear Safeguard Accords.

The resolution expresses a serious concern for the fact that North Korea does not abide by the Nuclear Safeguard Accords with the IAEA, and that the range of the nonfulfillment of its obligation has recently enlarged.

On 5 October the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that expresses a concern in connection with the North Korean nuclear issue. This will be the first UN General Assembly's resolution against North Korea.

Japan's SANKEI SHIMBUN reported today that in the UN General Assembly slated for 1 November, the IAEA will strongly denounce North Korea for its attitude in connection with suspicion of its nuclear development. Also, it will request that the General Assembly establish measures that will enable North Korea to accept the nuclear inspection immediately.

Concerning this, a U.S. Government official said that although North Korea had once again refused to accept international inspection of the nuclear facilities within its country, it is likely that the North Korean side will change its policy, at the final stage, because it regards the nuclear inspection issue as a means of negotiations to obtain diplomatic recognition from the United States. [end recording]

Urge Immediate DPRK Cooperation

*SK0211003093 Seoul YONHAP in English
0015 GMT 2 Nov 93*

[Text] New York, Nov. 1 (YONHAP)—The U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution Monday urging North Korea “to cooperate immediately” with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on nuclear inspections.

The resolution passed with 140 “yes” votes, one “no” and nine abstentions.

The nine-point resolution was adopted after Agency Director-General Hans Blix made his annual, updated report to the General Assembly on negotiations with North Korea on continuing its nuclear safeguards activities.

The communist state is limiting IAEA access to suspicious nuclear compounds and fear is rising that inspection

cameras may already have run out of battery and film, preventing verification that North Korea is not engaged in covert nuclear development.

The resolution registered "grave concern that (North Korea) has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance."

It "urges (North Korea) to cooperate immediately with the agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement" while commanding efforts by Blix and the Secretariat to implement the agreement with Pyongyang.

The U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution pressing North Korea to comply with IAEA safeguards April 1. This is the first time that the General Assembly has passed a resolution on this matter.

Moscow Radio Comments on UN Resolution on DPRK

SK0311130193 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1200 GMT 2 Nov 93

[From "Today's Program"]

[Text] The United Nations has called on the DPRK to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. This call is included in a resolution on international nuclear energy adopted by the United Nations.

This resolution notes, for example, that Pyongyang has refused to meet the conditions necessary for the inspection of nuclear facilities and that this surely makes one doubt if North Korea has intentions to develop nuclear weapons.

The UN General Assembly noted that the DPRK has not fulfilled its duty of implementing its treaty with the IAEA.

The dispute between the IAEA and Pyongyang started early this year when the issue of inspecting two unreported nuclear facilities was raised. The DPRK has failed to assess the situation correctly, saying they are military facilities that have nothing to do with any nuclear program. The DPRK has considered the IAEA's demand to be a flagrant violation of the country's sovereignty.

Last March, Pyongyang announced it would withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. It canceled this decision a little later. Nevertheless, the situation is still tense. This is because [words indistinct] prospects for development on the Korean peninsula and in the entire Asian-Pacific region.

The efforts by the United States, Russia, Japan, the ROK, and other countries to resolve this dispute did not work. Therefore, the United Nations had no choice but to intervene in the dispute. The United Nations has urged the DPRK to cooperate with the IAEA.

The resolution does not mention sanctions over the DPRK's failure to realize its duty. Still, this document is considered to be a grave warning that was issued for the sake of peace. The nuclear issue must be resolved without fail. It must be, for the sake of the DPRK and for the interests of its neighbors and the entire international community.

The DPRK has stressed that this issue can be resolved in talks between the DPRK and the United States. It has done

so because it has some requests to the United States. The DPRK has asked the United States to improve bilateral relations, discontinue joint military exercises with the ROK, and allow inspection of U.S. military facilities in the ROK to verify if there are nuclear weapons.

We would like to believe that if Pyongyang and Washington have contact, it would be efficient.

DPRK, IAEA Reportedly Meet To Discuss Ad Hoc Inspection

SK0111015393 Seoul YONHAP in English
0142 GMT 1 Nov 93

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 1 (YONHAP)—North Korea is engaged in behind-the-scenes contacts with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to coordinate their positions on the scope of IAEA ad hoc inspections of North Korea's nuclear installations, a government official said Monday.

North Korea is willing to accept routine inspections of three nuclear facilities in Yongbyon but wants to limit ad hoc inspections to part of the facilities, whereas the agency demands full-scope inspection of all four targeted installations, he said.

"As far as I know, North Korea's position is that it accepts routine inspections such as replacing films and batteries in monitoring cameras but can accept ad hoc inspections only of part of the four installations," he said.

"The IAEA, however, is calling for full-scope inspections on all four installations and negotiations are under way between the two sides over the objects and level of the ad hoc inspections."

The negotiations have not yet made progress, but it cannot be ruled out that North Korea will change its position before the U.N. General Assembly adopts a resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue and agree to resumption of ad hoc inspection, the official said.

Subject to routine IAEA inspection are three facilities, including an experimental reactor and a critical equipment.

Four facilities, including a 5-megawatt reactor and a radioactive chemical laboratory, are subject to ad hoc inspections.

North Korea says it cannot allow special inspections at two unreported facilities that are suspected of housing nuclear waste, he said.

IAEA Says DPRK Continues To Refuse Overall Inspection

SK0111020593 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
1 Nov 93 p 2

[AFP, YONHAP from Vienna]

[Text] An International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] spokesman said on 31 October that although North Korea continues to refuse an overall inspection of its suspected nuclear facilities, it will allow the monitoring cameras operation to continue, including the change of batteries and tapes in the cameras.

The spokesman confirmed that North Korea informed the IAEA of it on 28 October, and said that "the IAEA has not yet sent a reply to North Korea concerning such decision."

He said: "Such North Korean proposal is inappropriate. It is imperative to resume the inspection, which was suspended in February."

Prior to his statement, the U.S. NEW YORK TIMES reported on 30 October that North Korea had allowed the monitoring cameras operation to continue. It also reported, quoting the remarks made by U.S. diplomats, that "because of North Korea's continued refusal to accept the nuclear inspection, the third U.S.-North Korean high-level talks may be canceled," and that "the talks would not be held until the nuclear inspection issue is settled."

IAEA Suspends Maintenance of Cameras in DPRK

AU0311081093 Paris AFP in English 0351 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Vienna, Nov 3 (AFP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will not for the time being send teams to nuclear sites in North Korea to maintain its surveillance equipment there, a spokesman at IAEA headquarters here said Tuesday.

The decision follows Pyongyang's refusal last week to allow the IAEA to monitor fully its nuclear facilities at the Yonbyon complex, although it authorised inspectors to change films and batteries in surveillance cameras installed at the sites.

IAEA head Hans Blix said Monday that countries could not pick and choose which aspects of inspection programmes it would permit to go ahead.

Blix also told the UN General Assembly, which called Monday on North Korea to cooperate fully and immediately with IAEA demands, that while Pyongyang refused to furnish requested information or authorize inspections, it remained possible that it was trying to build a nuclear bomb.

The latest three-monthly IAEA maintenance mission to North Korean sites was due to take place by early November.

Moscow Radio Calls on DPRK To Accept Nuclear Inspections

SK0611002193 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1200 GMT 4 Nov 93

[From "Today's World" Program]

[Text] The annual Security Consultative Meeting [SCM] to discuss the security issue on the Korean peninsula was held in Seoul in the presence of the ROK defense minister and the U.S. secretary of defense. The issue on international inspections of the DPRK's nuclear facilities was discussed during the SCM.

It looks as though the two sides have considered the DPRK's stance on the nuclear issue to some extent. For example, Pyongyang had refused to accept International Atomic Energy [IAEA] inspection under the pretext of the Team Spirit exercise, an annual joint military exercise. The DPRK leadership had branded the Team Spirit joint military exercise a preliminary stage of war of aggression.

Regarding this issue, the two sides' defense ministers pointed out that the ROK and the United States are willing to give up the joint military exercise if Pyongyang accepts nuclear inspections.

Nevertheless, Pyongyang still adheres to its firm stance on the nuclear issue. For instance, the DPRK did not care when the UN General Assembly urged cooperation with the IAEA. In addition, Pyongyang is not interested in the assertion by the ROK and the U.S. defense ministers that the decision on the Team Spirit exercise depends on Pyongyang's nuclear program. Worse still, Pyongyang criticized the SCM held in Seoul, and did not show up for a meeting between the North and South scheduled for 4 November.

The deadlock will be broken only when the two sides make concessions to each other.

Pyongyang must reconsider its stance and duly accept inspections. This would be the most effective way for the settlement of the issue. Only then will the international community support Pyongyang.

More on Iranian Attempts To Smuggle Nuclear Materials in Turkey

Four Arrested Iranians Named

94ES0088A Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish
6 Oct 93 pp 1, 25

[Article by Istiklal Sevinc: "Atomic Operation"]

[Text] Istanbul—Eight persons were arrested attempting to take to Iran 2.5 Kilos of enriched "uranium 238" that they had brought into Istanbul illegally from Russia. Four of the eight are Turkish businessmen and the others reportedly agents of Iran's secret service, SAVAMA. The uranium, which is used in building atomic bombs, is worth around 1.240 trillion liras, it was learned.

Teams from the Finance Branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate, acting on a tip that four SAVAMA agents had come to Istanbul from Iran to buy uranium, began following the agents, who were staying at the Movenpick Hotel in the Maslak section of Istanbul. Their investigation turned up plans for Neyir Department Stores owner and Economics Professor Pinar Bakir to deliver the uranium to the Iranians. Security teams arranged a raid on the hotel yesterday morning and took into custody Iranians Muhammed Seyidi, Davud Ahmed, Huseyin Sherabi, and a person named Serdar, whose surname could not be obtained.

The teams learned from the Iranian's statements that the uranium would change hands at the Neyir Department Stores office in the Dedeman Office Building in Gayrettepe. They arranged a raid and arrested Pinar Bakir, Fortuna Textiles owner Bulet Ozsoy, Hikmet Uzat, and Turker Gelendost. Seized in the search of the office were 2.5 kilos of enriched "uranium 238," which is used in the construction of atomic bombs.

Authorities pointed out that 1 gram of uranium costs \$40,000 (about 480 million liras) and said, "we have carried out the second uranium operation in the world

after the one in East Germany some years ago. The uranium is worth a trillion liras." The investigation is reportedly continuing.

Operation of the Century Began at Movenpick Hotel in Maslak

Police discovered that the Iranian agents were staying at the Movenpick Hotel and that the uranium was hidden at the Nevir Department Stores bookkeeping service. The merchants were killed in the sudden raid and the police found 2.5 kilos of enriched uranium. Then the agents who came from Iran took their turn to be arrested.

Turkish Forces in Anti-Smuggling Operation

94ES0088B Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish
7 Oct 93 pp 1, 16

[Article by Ercument Isleyan: "Police on 'Red Mercury' Alert"]

[Excerpts] While it is being suggested that Istanbul has become the headquarters for selling enriched uranium, known as "Red Mercury," that the world's espionage organizations are so eager to obtain, the fear it would get into the hands of terrorist organizations is also pointed out. The Security Directorate has reportedly formed a "nuclear desk" for this reason.

The information obtained in the operation carried out two days ago by Finance Branch squads in Istanbul indicated that international smuggling rings and their agents meet in Istanbul for enriched uranium.

"Enriched uranium" became a household word with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The red mercury, said to be produced in Kazakhstan at bases belonging to the former Soviet Union and at the Oust-Kemenogorsk Chemical Factory, is reportedly brought to Turkey via various routes by international smuggling rings.

Enriched uranium produced in the Al Umera region since the destruction, during the "Gulf Crisis," of the nuclear depots under Saddam Hussein's control in Northern Iraq, supposedly passes into the hands of smugglers and is taken into the Shegar region via Kirkuk and Mosul, and reaches Silopi, Cizre, and Uludere via Dohuk, Zaho, Amedie, Helve, and Jeme Juhi.

It is also claimed that Romania and Bulgaria are used as way stations to bring the red mercury, which has radioactive properties, to Turkey from Iraq or Kazakhstan and that it is routed into Turkey from the Sinop beaches.

Red mercury is also sold by countries such as the United States and France, in addition to the Middle Eastern countries. [passage omitted] The French Intelligence Service warned Interpol in 1991 that the Bulgarian police had apprehended a ring trying to smuggle red mercury into Turkey.

'Key Man' in Smuggling Operation Identified

94ES0088C Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 7 Oct 93 p 16

[Text] Istanbul—MILLIYET NEWS CENTER—Turker Gelendost is said to be the "key man" in smuggling into Turkey from Russia the 2.5 kilos of uranium that was

seized in a raid on the Neyir Textile Store's accounting service in the Dedeman office building in Geyrettepe.

Questioning is continuing of the Iranian citizens Muhammed Cede, Davud Ahmedi, Huseyin Shehrabi, and Serdar and of Neyir Stores owner Professor Pinar Bakir, Bulent Ozsoy, Hikmet Uzat, and Turker Gelendost, who were arrested in the operation carried out 2 days ago by Istanbul Finance Branch squads. Police said that Gelendost was the person who organized bringing the uranium from Russia.

"Low Quality"

Erol Balikcigil, deputy head of the Cekmeci Nuclear Research Center said in press release to AA that the rate of enrichment of the uranium was low and that it could not be used in building an atomic bomb for this reason.

Balikcigil stressed that if the enrichment rate of the uranium were 99 percent it would be dangerous and that the uranium seized could be used only as fuel raw material for a light water nuclear power reactor.

[Beginning of boxed passage] Iranian Denial

Tehran—AA—The Iranian government denied the reports appearing in the Turkish press that the uranium obtained illegally from Russia was intended for sale to Iran via Turkey.

Alaeddin Borujerdi, head of the Asia-Oceania desk at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, told Turkey's Tehran Ambassador Korkmaz Haktanir that "claims like this are a plot aimed at damaging Turkish-Iranian relations." [end of boxed passage]

Fifth Iranian Said Involved in Smuggling

94ES0088D Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 8 Oct 93 p 22

[Text] Istanbul—MILLIYET NEWS CENTER—Another Iranian is being sought in addition to the eight men, including four Iranians, who were arrested with 2.5 kilos of uranium in an operation by Istanbul Finance Branch squads. It was announced that the border gates have been warned that this Iranian, who is the key man in the uranium smuggling, may try to leave the country. Authorities said, "We do not want to announce the identity of this person. The whole incident will be resolved when we catch him."

The eight persons now in custody were taken to the Technical Branch in Gayrettepe for finger printing yesterday. The suspects relatives attacked reporters as they entered the branch building, shouting threats of "You'll pay for this." Police came on the scene and brought the incident under control, while some persons were reportedly held for questioning.

Name Similarity in Uranium Incident

94ES0088E Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 8 Oct 93 p 26

[Text] An announcement made by the Fortuna Textile Products Import Export Trade and Industry Limited Company in connection with the "atomic operation in Istanbul" included the following statement: "The name 'Fortuna Textiles' was referred to as the company belonging to Bulent Ozsoy, one of the accused in the operation. Our

company, named Fortuna Textile Products Import Export Trade and Industry Limited Company and headquartered in Izmir, was founded in January 1984 and the owners are Selami Gurguc, Nazan Gurguc, and Zeynep Gurguc. There are no other partners."

Background on Turkish Uranium Smuggler

94WP0024A *Istanbul MILLIYET* in Turkish 9 Oct 93 p 6

[Editorial on the Economy page by Meral Tamer]

[Text] When I first met businessman Pinar Bakir, who was arrested with 2.5 kilos of uranium, he was a member of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry [ISO] board of directors. He, along with Engin Koyuncu and Omer Dinckok, put the firm stamp of textiles on the ISO's 10-member board of directors. It did not enter my mind in the least that he would one day become the channel for the sale of illegal uranium from Russia to Iran. He was apparently involved in fraudulent exports also. Even though Koc's Ram Company and the Dinckok family's foreign trade companies got into trouble with fraudulent exports, it was the Akin Group's foreign trade company, EDPA, that really suffered. I have always been interested in the course of people's lives; where they come from and where they are going. I'm terrifically curious about the past of people I meet. But I skipped Pinar Bakir for some reason. Now I'm closing that gap:

Pinar Bakir, the son of a retired colonel, was a hard worker and star student at Bogazici University, where he went after graduating from Pendik Lycee. After Bogazici, he earned his master's degree at Michigan University. He then returned home and began teaching at the university in Sultanahmet, which at that time was named the Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences. He soon began providing business consultation services and became acquainted with Munir Yilmaz, the owner of Herboy Textiles, during this time. He was later general director of Herboy, and later on, they established the Herteks company. For some reason, Herteks went under and they sold it to Mehmet Okumus. Pinar Bakir began at Herboy as a modest college faculty member and regardless of the material resources he may have had when he left, he would become the owner of the Neyir department stores shortly after the failure of Herteks. He and Okumus were working together at this time. At any rate, Okumus himself would buy Sesa, the company that produced goods for Neyir.

Pinar Bakir reportedly had cards printed representing him as a "professor" while he was still an assistant professor. He was teaching at Marmara University, now that he does in fact have professor status. He is said to have changed wives in parallel with his ascent in business life.

Details on Finance Branch's Uranium Operation

94WP0024B *Istanbul MILLIYET* in Turkish 9 Oct 93 p 16

[Article by Istiklal Sevinc]

[Text] Istanbul—The Istanbul Finance Branch's "U 238" Uranium Operation reportedly began by monitoring telephone conversations. The operation, which Finance Branch Director Salih Gungor led in person, began with the monitoring of telephone conversations between Turker Erdost, reportedly a former militant of the THKPC, Pinar Bakir, owner of the Neyir stores, and Bulent Ozsoy, a

partner in Fortuna Textiles stores and a former convicted smuggler of historic artifacts, and three other people. It was learned from the telephone conversations that the Iranian agents came to Istanbul and registered at the Movenpick Hotel. The telephones, which were tapped by permission of the prosecutor's office, also revealed that the SAVAMA agents were bargaining through Pinar Bakir as the mediator to buy the 2.5 kilos of uranium that Turker Erdost had in his possession. The raid was carried out the day the goods were to be delivered.

The apprehended suspects said that they were going to sell the uranium to the Iranians for \$40,000 a gram.

DGM Sent Back

The eight suspects, including the Iranian agents, were questioned at the Finance Branch and were sent yesterday to the State Security Court [DGM]. However, the DGM prosecutor sent them back to the Finance Branch, saying there were some deficiencies in the documentation. The uranium suspects were to be interrogated for 3 additional days, it was learned.

Finance Police yesterday conducted a walk-through in connection with the 2.5 kilos of enriched uranium, understood to have been brought to Istanbul by sea from Russia in March and April in order to be sent to Iran.

During the exercise, conducted under strict security conditions, Turker Erdost, one of the ring's agents, showed the Finance Police where he had hidden the uranium. Erdost showed where the nearly 1.5 trillion liras worth of uranium, wrapped in plastic bags, was hidden in the coal cellar of his mother Gulbahar Erdost's home at 9 Akdeniz Avenue in the Guzeltepe Quarter of Kagithane. He explained how the uranium had been hidden between bags of onions and potatoes and said, "We would have delivered the uranium to the Iranians if we had not been caught."

Armenian Connection Alleged

94WP0024C *Istanbul MILLIYET* in Turkish 9 Oct 93 p 16

[Article by Ozge Ozgen]

[Text] Ankara—Armenians sold uranium to Iran during the time of former Azerbaijan President Abulfaz Elchibey, according to claims.

Popular Front authorities said that large quantities of uranium are found in the mountains of the Kelbejer region in southern Nagorno Karabakh. Two and one-half kilos of uranium were supposedly extracted before Kelbejer fell to the Armenians and were sold to Iran.

Popular Front authorities said that the Armenians who occupied Kelbejer both opened up a second corridor to Nagorno Karabakh and also seized the uranium, called red mercury, being mined in the Kelbejer mountains. The Armenians reportedly processed the red mercury with the aid of Russian scientists and intended to use it to build an atomic bomb.

Civilian and military experts on atomic bombs, who gave information to *MILLIYET*, said that the material called red mercury is used in the construction of atomic bombs and that the steam especially was extremely dangerous.

Authorities also pointed out that the uranium used on rocket warheads would lead to massive death wherever the rockets struck.

Japanese, Russian Meeting on Nuclear Dismantling Planned

*OW0511102893 Tokyo KYODO in English
1005 GMT 5 Nov 93*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 5 KYODO—Japan and Russia will hold the first meeting of a bilateral committee on cooperation in nuclear dismantling next Friday [12 November] to discuss specific fields of cooperation and procedures, the Foreign Ministry said Friday.

The two sides agreed to set up the committee during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Japan in mid-October.

Japanese ambassador to Russia Sumio Edamura and Akira Hayashi, the Foreign Ministry's director general for arms control and scientific affairs, will attend the meeting, the ministry said.

The Russian side will be attended by officials from the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry and the Atomic Energy Ministry, it said.

Japan announced in April at the ministerial meeting of the Group of Seven (G-7) nations that it would extend a grant-in-aid of about 100 million dollars for the promotion of nuclear weapons destruction in the former Soviet Union.

In a related move, Japan and Russia will also hold a joint working group meeting in Moscow next Wednesday and Thursday to discuss Russia's disposal of radioactive waste into the ocean, the ministry said.

The Russian Navy on October 17 dumped 900 tons liquid radioactive waste into the sea of Japan. Moscow canceled a planned second dumping following strong protests from Japan and South Korea.

Japan, Germany Favor Extending Non-Proliferation Treaty

*LD0411095393 Hamburg DPA in German
0821 GMT 4 Nov 93*

[Text] Tokyo (DPA)—Japan and Germany are in favor of an "indefinite extension" of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty from 1995 onward. German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe said in Tokyo today, commenting on his talks there, that both sides agree on the demand that the countries which have not yet done so should accede to the treaty. His visit to the memorial to the bombing of Nagasaki and his meeting with the mayor of the city showed him how important the Non-Proliferation Treaty is, Ruehe said at the conclusion of his 3-day visit to Japan.

Ruehe stressed as the third point of agreement the demands for further disarmament, for negotiations on an end to nuclear tests, and for the eradication of chemical weapons, with a ban on production of these weapons. Ruehe said that Japan could help to ensure that nuclear disarmament does not fail for technological and financial reasons.

In view of the refusal of North Korea to allow an international inspection of its suspected plans to construct nuclear missiles, non-proliferation was a high priority on Ruehe's talks in Japan and prior to that in South Korea.

Ruehe also held discussions with his Japanese counterpart Keisuke Nakanishi with regard to the two countries' experiences of their first involvements in United Nations' peace missions. The two ministers agreed to hold regular defense consultations. Ruehe invited Nakanishi to visit Germany in 1994.

Before his return flight Ruehe also met Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata. A planned meeting with Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa did not take place due to scheduling difficulties on both sides.

According to Ruehe there is "no agreed approach" by the two countries on the issue of a permanent seat for Japan and Germany on the United Nations' Security Council. Tokyo and Bonn are, he said, in agreement that responsibility of this kind should be given to the two countries because of their political and economic potential and not in return for their participation in military missions. This then includes the willingness to join military missions. Ruehe added that he is capable of "waiting quite patiently" for a permanent seat.

ROK, Canada Agree On Stronger Nuclear Technology Relations

*SK3010070793 Seoul YONHAP in English
0437 GMT 30 Oct 93*

[Text] Seoul, Oct. 30 (YONHAP)—The South Korean and Canadian Governments agreed on stronger technology cooperation on nuclear fuel development for light- and heavy-water reactors in a 3-day meeting of their Joint Nuclear Energy Coordination Committee in Seoul ending on Friday, the Science and Technology Ministry said Saturday.

The two promised to introduce a training program for Koreans in Canada and joint advancement into third countries with their atomic energy technology.

They agreed to discuss a revision to the Korea-Canada Atomic Energy Cooperation Accord, signed in January 1976, through formal diplomatic channels.

With some amendments to the existing bilateral agreement, the two countries can strengthen partnership and mutual benefit in nuclear energy cooperation, Ministry officials said.

Other agreed issues of this week's meeting include technology transfer of nuclear fuel, assistance to Korean technicians for training and study of Canada-made "Candu" reactor system in third countries, and cooperation in managing radioactive waste.

Seoul and Ottawa also pledged close cooperation on the international stage on problems like extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and peaceful use of atomic energy.

Kazakhstan Seeks Iran's Help To Develop Nuclear Capability

NC031114293 Beirut AL-SHIRAA in Arabic 1 Nov 93 p 12

[Text] During his visit to Kazakhstan, Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani approached Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev with a request to send Kazakh nuclear experts to Iran to help develop its nuclear capability.

Engineer Reza Amrollahi, Iranian deputy president for atomic affairs and chairman of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, has held a meeting for that purpose with Kazakh nuclear experts.

Thai Deputy Minister To Visit Libya To Prevent Layoffs

BK0411021593 Bangkok THE NATION in English 4 Nov 93 p A9

[Text] Deputy Labour Minister Phaithun Kaeothong is expected to travel to Libya in an effort to ensure that it does not lay off thousands of Thai workers following a recent crackdown on job placement agents in Bangkok suspected of sending workers to alleged chemical or nuclear weapons plants there.

Labour ministry sources said Phaitun was awaiting the outcome of lower-level negotiations between a Thai government delegation and Libyan authorities before leaving secretly for Tripoli.

Interior Minister and Labour Minister Chawalit Yongchaiyut said he believed the Libyan government would not take the punitive action against Thai workers in the country now that the negotiations were underway.

"But the Labour Ministry is fully prepared to handle any consequences of a mass layoff of Thais in Libya," Gen Chawalit said.

Sources said a meeting chaired by Chawalit at the Labour Ministry yesterday agreed that Thailand should make use

of its leverage as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement in the talks with the Libyan government.

"Although Thailand and Libya do not have direct diplomatic ties, we both belong to the Non-Aligned Movement," one of the sources said.

On Tuesday, Foreign Minister Prasong Sunsiri said Thailand's crackdown on job placement agents suspected of supplying workers for chemical weapons plants in Libya was in line with an international convention against chemical weapons.

German Ministry Says Iran, Libya, Syria Have CW Programs

LD0211182793 Hamburg DPA in German 1642 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] Frankfurt/Main (DPA)—According to the Federal Economics Ministry, Iran and Libya are currently trying to acquire biological weapons. Quoting intelligence information, Hans Dieter Hermann of the Bonn ministry told experts at a meeting in Frankfurt today that there were chemical weapons programs in Syria, Iran, Libya, and Pakistan. These countries were increasingly attempting to set up their own production plants. The primary chemical products were ordered under innocent-sounding descriptions. Hermann warned, in this connection, of disguised orders.

Hermann said that the countries were also increasingly trying to buy plant for the manufacture of chemical weapons disguised as pesticide factories. A plant for the manufacture of antibiotics could also be used to manufacture biological weapons, he said. If an accompanying plant for packaging the medicines was not ordered, or if it was later cancelled the supplier should become suspicious, he said.

The experts also identified weak points in export controls on civil products of the plant manufacturing and chemical industries that could be of military use. As well as lengthy processing periods and complicated laws relating to export approval, the participants also complained about the checks by the Federal Export Office.

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